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INTRODUCTION
In a case where one person mistakenly pays another person, the courts
have traditionally allowed recovery of that payment, at least under circum-
stances where it would be unjust for the recipient to keep it. This common
law restitutionary right is generally available today in a wide range of
circumstances. In the context of bank payments, however, the availability
of common law restitution is highly problematic, despite there being a
number of situations in which a bank might mistakenly pay a customer's
check.'
The perplexing issues generated in this situation revolve around two basic
problems. First, the Uniform Commercial Code's (U.C.C. or Code)2 final
payment rule purports to be a limitation on the bank's restitutionary rights
in mistaken payment cases; however, the extent to which this rule bars
recovery of such payments is extremely unclear.3 Second, a minority of
courts in the nineteenth century developed a warranty theory as an alter-
native basis for recovery of mistaken bank payments. The drafters of the
Code adopted this warranty theory as the primary basis of recovering
mistaken payments but failed to address how the warranty scheme relates
to and the extent to which it "displaces" common law restitutionary rights.
4
Courts continue to be baffled by these seemingly intractable problems. Not
surprisingly, legal scholars have generated a tremendous amount of com-
mentary in an effort to find a solution.' These efforts have been largely
disappointing.
1. For a discussion of common law restitution, see infra notes 17-37 and accompanying
text. For a discussion of restitution in the context of mistaken payments by a bank, see infra
notes 38-65, 84-179 and accompanying text.
2. U.C.C. (1989). For a table listing those states that have adopted the U.C.C. and the
respective state codifications, see UNrF. COMMERCIAL CODE, 1 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. 1989).
3. The final payment rule is found in U.C.C. §§ 3-418, 4-213 and 4-302. See infra notes
100-79 and accompanying text.
4. For a discussion of warranty under pre-Code law, see infra notes 56-63, 72-83 and
accompanying text. For a discussion of warranty under the Code, see infra notes 91-179 and
accompanying text.
5. See, e.g., O'Malley, Common Check Frauds and the Commercial Code, 23 Rurrzas
L. Rnv. 189 (1969); Comment, Commercial Paper and Forgery: Broader Liability for Banks?,
1980 U. ILL. L.F. 813 [hereinafter Comment, Broader Liability]; Note, Commercial Transac-
tions-Commercial Paper-Allocation of Liability for Checks Bearing Unauthorized Indorse-
ments and Unauthorized Drawer's Signatures, 24 WAYNE L. Rn:v 1077 (1978) [hereinafter
Note, Allocation]; Note, The Doctrine of Price v. Neal Under Articles Three and Four of the
Commercial Code, 23 U. Prrr. L. Rnv. 198 (1961) [hereinafter Note, Doctrine].
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The first major purpose of this Article is to remedy this situation by
analyzing the law relating to recovery of mistaken bank payments. In order
to avoid the pitfalls encountered by the existing literature on this subject,
this analysis will include a consideration of 1) the historical development of
common law restitution and alternative theories of recovering bank pay-
ments; 2) the application of these theories in the context of the contemporary
check collection system; 3) the historical development of the final payment
rule; and 4) the current statutory basis of that rule. This analysis will show
that the Code sections related to restitutionary rights and the final payment
rule ultimately cannot be reconciled. This results from a major conceptual
blunder committed by the drafters of the original Code. The solution to
the problems related to recovery of mistaken bank payments lies in amending
the relevant Code sections.
A major drafting project is currently underway which proposes to exten-
sively revise articles 3 and 4 of the Code. 6 This important project presents
a rare and valuable opportunity to fashion a permanent statutory solution
to the problem of recovering mistaken bank payments. The second major
purpose of this Article is to analyze these proposed revisions to see if the
drafters have adequately addressed the concerns discussed herein.
This analysis will show that the changes embodied in the proposed
revisions of articles 3 and 4 are largely superficial. These changes will fail
to remedy the problems surrounding the recovery of mistaken bank payments
because the present drafting committee unfortunately has committed essen-
tially the same blunder as the drafters of the original version of the Code
committed. In the final part of the Article, a new unified theory of recovery
will be suggested as a preferable alternative to the present Code as well as
the proposed changes.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE PROBLEM
Inasmuch as this Article will consider the extent to which restitution is
available to a bank, it is first necessary to briefly describe the ways in
6. The proposed revisions of the Code (R.U.C.C.) attempt, among other things, to spell
out more clearly the effect of final payment upon the payor bank's restitutionary rights. The
drafting project, entitled "Commercial Code-Current Payment Methods" is sponsored by the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.) and the
American Law Institute (A.L.I.). For background on the R.U.C.C. project, see generally
Ballen, Baxter, McTaggart, Nyquist & Rubin, Commercial Paper, Bank Deposits and Collec-
tions, and Other Payment Systems, 44 Bus. LAw. 1515, 1538-51 (1989). Revisions to article 3
and article 4 are currently under consideration by the N.C.C.U.S.L. References to the R.U.C.C.
are to the article 3 draft and number 1 article 4 draft, both dated February 1, 1990. References
to the R.U.C.C. Prefatory Note are to that which accompanied a March 1989 draft.
Passage of the Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-86 (1987),
should be noted. The Equality Banking Act granted the Federal Reserve Board ultimate
regulatory authority over the nation's check collection process. Id. § 609(c). Pursuant to this
authority the Federal Reserve Board has promulgated regulations. See 12 C.F.R. §§ 210, 229
(1989) [hereinafter Reg. CC]. Reg. CC does not have a significant impact on the issues
discussed in this Article. Nevertheless, the effect of Reg. CC will be noted where relevant.
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which a bank might mistakenly pay a check and the role that restitution
would play in that situation. Following presentment7 of a check to the payor
bank,8 it can be paid9 in several ways. The most important are (1) the payor
bank can pay the item in cash;'0 and (2) the payor bank can fail to return
the item and revoke provisional settlements within the time permitted." In
a case where the payor has intentionally or inadvertently failed to make a
timely return of the item, the U.C.C. provides that the payor is "account-
able" for the amount of the item. 12 This is uniformly interpreted by the
courts to mean "liable" for the item.13
It is in the process of determining whether an item should be paid that
the payor bank might make a mistake and pay an item that is not properly
payable.14 The payor may, for example, pay an item bearing a forged
7. "Presentment" is a demand for payment made upon the drawee bank. U.C.C. § 3-
504(1).
8. The U.C.C. defines the "payor bank" as "a bank by which an item is payable as
drawn or accepted." Id. § 4-105(b). The payor bank is also referred to as the drawee bank.
See id. § 3-102 comment 3. The drawee is the entity on which the check or draft is drawn.
Id. § 3-503(2); see also R. BRAUCHER & R. RIEGERT, INTRODUCTION TO COMMERCIAL TRANS-
ACTIONS 64 (1977); D. WHALEY, PROBLEMS & MATERIAMLS ON NEGOTILE INsTRUMENrs 2 (2d
ed. 1988).
9. Methods of paying an item, which under the Code are referred to as final payment in
order to distinguish them from a provisional payment or settlement, are governed by U.C.C.
§ 4-213.
10. U.C.C. § 4-213(l)(a). This means simply that the payor disburses cash to the presenting
party. Note that when the payor pays the item in cash it settles for and finally pays the item
at the same time.
11. If the payor bank decides to dishonor the check, it will return the check to the
depositary bank and revoke any provisional credit it may have given. Id. § 4-301(1). The
payor must exercise its right to revoke any provisional credits within applicable time limits set
by statute, agreement, or clearinghouse rule. Id. §§ 4-301(1), 4-302, 4-213. The deadline may
be established by agreement pursuant to U.C.C. § 4-103(1). Absent such agreement, the
applicable time period is the "midnight deadline" as defined in U.C.C. § 4-104(l)(h). The
midnight deadline "is midnight on its next banking day following the banking day on which
it receives the relevant item." Id. § 4-104(I)(h).
12. Id. § 4-302. It is surprisingly common for banks to, for example, delay the decision
to pay in an effort to ascertain the validity of the item or the sufficiency of funds in the
drawer's account, and liability often results. See, e.g., Western Air & Refrigeration, Inc. v.
Metro Bank, 599 F.2d 83, 84-85 (5th Cir. 1979); New Ulm State Bank v. Brown, 558 S.W.2d
20, 22 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977).
13. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
14. The payor bank may take money out of its customer's account to pay an item only if
that item is properly payable. U.C.C. § 4-401(1); see, e.g., National Credit Union Admin. v.
Michigan Nat'l Bank, 771 F.2d 154, 156 (6th Cir. 1985); Cumis Ins. Soc'y v. Girard Bank,
522 F. Supp. 414, 418 (E.D. Pa. 1981). Items that are not properly payable include: a check
containing a forged drawer's signature (see, e.g., Danning. v. Bank of Am. Nat'l Trust & Say.
Ass'n, 151 Cal. App. 3d 961, 969, 199 Cal. Rptr. 163, 168 (1984); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co.
v. Security Pac. Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 797, 805 n.7, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883, 889 n.7, 905
(1978)); the absence of a necessary indorsement (see, e.g., Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank,
553 F.2d 398, 403 (5th Cir. 1977); Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App.
328, 331, 548 P.2d 563, 566 (1976)); the material alteration of an item (see O'Malley, supra
note 5); and the lack of sufficient funds in the drawer's account from which to pay the item.
U.C.C. § 4-104(1)(i). The payor bank may, however, choose to pay the check even though
doing so creates an overdraft. Id. § 4-401(1).
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indorsement or a forged drawer's signature. Such items are not properly
payable. If the payor bank pays an item that is not properly payable it
must recredit its customer's account, absent customer negligence or other
valid defense.'5
After an item has been paid through any of the possible methods of
payment (whether or not the payment was a mistaken one) the payor bank
will be in one of two positions with respect to the party who presented the
item. The payor will have actually paid the money out as payment for the
item, or the payor will still have the money but be "accountable" for it to
a presenting party. This latter case would exist when the payor allowed the
midnight (or other) deadline to expire without paying cash out for the item
or dishonoring it. This is also precisely the situation the payor bank will
find itself in when the item was paid by mistake. Unless it can recover the
payment from presenting parties or avoid being held liable by presenting
parties, it will bear the loss for the mistaken payment.
The fundamental issues examined in this Article are whether, under the
first situation, the payor can use common law restitution to recover funds
it mistakenly paid out for an item,' 6 or whether, under the second situation,
the payor can use common law restitution to avoid having to pay the
amount of an item for which it is accountable.
The use of common law restitution in this situation is highly problematic.
In more than two hundred years of development the courts have created a
complicated array of exceptions and limitations on the availability of res-
titution to recover mistaken payments. Moreover, both article 3 and article
4 of the Code purport to impose statutory limits on the right to restitution
of mistaken payments; however, the precise nature of these limits is unclear.
Of particular importance is the relationship between a bank's right to
common law restitution and its liability under the accountability provisions
of article 4. The payor bank may also assert a warranty action in certain
cases of mistaken payment; however, while the scope of that action is fairly
certain its impact on the bank's restitutionary right is very unclear. Code
limitations on the right of restitution will be examined in detail in the later
sections of this Article; however, it is first necessary to examine the common
law development of restitution and its role in recovery of mistaken bank
payments prior to the Code.
15. See, e.g., G & R Corp. v. American Sec. & Trust Co., 523 F.2d 1164, 1169 (D.C.
Cir. 1975); Isaac v. American Heritage Bank & Trust Co., 675 P.2d 742, 744 (Colo. 1984);
Bank of the West, 15 Wash. App. at 238, 548 P.2d at 563. Under U.C.C. §§ 3-406 and 4-
406 customer negligence can "preclude" the customer from asserting the forgery or alteration,
technically making the item a properly payable one. Id. §§ 3-406, 4-406; Fireman's Fund Ins.
Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 797, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 883.
16. For a discussion of restitution and other potential claims in this situation, see infra
notes 38-39, 84-179 and accompanying text.
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II. RECOVERY OF MISTAKEN PAYMENTS UNDER PRE-CODE LAW
A. An Overview of Common Law Restitution
Under the common law action for money had and received, which has
its origins in early English law, a plaintiff can obtain restitution of money
paid to the defendant by mistake.17 Beginning with the leading case of
Moses v. MacFerlan,'8 decided in 1760, this action was heavily clothed in
equitable considerations. 9 These considerations, which are typically dis-
cussed under the rubric of unjust enrichment, remain paramount today.20
Under present law, the elements of an action to recover mistaken payments
can be simply stated; the plaintiff must show that money (a benefit) paid
to the defendant was the result of a mistake, and that it would be unjust
to allow the defendant to keep it.2I Because the defendant typically received
17. For background on this action, see generally J. DAWSON, UNUST ENRIcHMENT 12-14
(1951); D. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF REMEDIEs 232-36 (1973); 8 W. HoLDSWORTH,
A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 88-98 (1925); W. KEENER, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF QuASI-
CONTRACTS 14, 23 (1893); F. MAxmAz, THE FORMS OF AcTION AT COIMON LAW 53-57 (A.H.
Chaytor & W.J. Whittaker, eds. 1968); 1 G. PALMER, THE LAW OF REsTrruTiON 6-9 (1978);
T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 396-411 (1929); F. WOODWARD,
THE LAW OF QUASI CONTRACTS 2-4 (1913); Ames, The History of Assumpsit, 2 HARv. L. REv.
1 (1888) [hereinafter Ames, Assumpsit]; Corbin, Quasi-Contractual Obligations, 21 YALE L.J.
533, 533 (1912); Keener, Recovery of Money Paid Under Mistake of Fact, 1 HARv. L. REv.
211 (1887).
18. 97 Eng. Rep. 676 (K.B. 1760).
19. Moses, 97 Eng. Rep. at 678, 680-81. For commentary on this case, see J. DAWSON,
supra note 17, at 11-16; W. FRIDMANN, LEGAL THEORY 135 (5th ed. 1967); 8 W. HOLDSWORTH,
supra note 17, at 97; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 7-8; 2 G. PALR, supra note 17, at
501; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 291; F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 2, 8; Ames, The
Doctrine of Price v. Neal, 4 HARv. L. REv. 297, 299-300 (1891) [hereinafter Ames, Price v.
Neal]; Cohen, Change of Position in Quasi-Contracts, 45 HARv. L. REv. 1333, 1334-36 (1932).
20. See, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1487,
1492-94 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987); Northern Trust Co. v. Chase
Manhattan Bank, 582 F. Supp. 1380, 1384 (S.D.N.Y. 1984), aff'd, 748 F.2d 803 (2d Cir.
1984); Federal Ins. Co. v. Groveland State Bank, 37 N.Y.2d 252, 333 N.E.2d 334, 336, 372
N.Y.S.2d 18, (1975) (action is "founded upon equitable principles aimed at achieving justice").
For a case in which the court refused to weigh equitable considerations in a quasi-contract
action to recover a mistaken payment, see Consumers Power Co. v. County of Muskegon,
346 Mich. 243, 78 N.W.2d 223 (1956), overruled, Spoon-Shacket Co. v. Oakland County, 356
Mich. 151, 97 N.W.2d 25 (1959); see also RESTATEMENT OF REsxrruTioN § 1 (1937) ("A person
who has been unjustly enriched at the expense of another is required to make restitution.")
[hereinafter RESTATEMENT]; J. DAWSON, supra note 17, at 21-26; D. DOBBS, supra note 17, at
227-29; 1 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 1-8; 2 G. PA.LMER, supra note 17, at 500-01; Ames,
Assumpsit, supra note 17, at 66; Cohen, supra note 19, at 1336.
21. See, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 804 F.2d at 1487 (discussing New York law);
American Hominy Co. v. Millikin Nat'l Bank, 273 F. 550, 556 (S.D. Ill. 1920); Louisa Nat'l
Bank v. Kentucky Nat'l Bank, 239 Ky. 302, 39 S.W.2d 497, 499 (1931); Ellis & Morton v.
Ohio Life Ins. & Trust Co., 4 Ohio St. 628, 651 (1855), overruled, Hamden Lodge, I.O.O.F.
v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co., 127 Ohio St. 469, 189 N.E. 246 (1934); Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank,
628 S.W.2d 761, 763 (Tex. 1982); W. KEENER, supra note 17, at 20, 43, 139; F. WOODWARD,
supra note 17, at 9; Keener, supra note 17, at 218-22; Note, Effect of Bank's Credit to Payee
of Check in Misreliance Upon State of Drawer's Account, 21 COLUm. L. REv. 805, 805 (1921)
[hereinafter Note, Effect].
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the money innocently, the plaintiff generally is required to notify the
defendant that the payment was mistaken and demand its return before
bringing suit.22
Traditionally, the courts had restricted recovery to cases where the mistake23
was a mistake of fact, not a mistake of law.Y Although this distinction is
heavily criticized by commentators,2 and modified by statute in several
states, 26 it continues to prevail today in a majority of states. 27
22. W. KEENER, supra note 17, at 140-41; F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 49-51; Keener,
supra note 17, at 211, 218-21.
23. Under the Restatement, "mistake means a state of mind not in accord with the facts."
RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 6; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 458-61 (unilateral mistake
a sufficient basis for restitution in cases of the mistaken performance of a contract). For a
discussion on various types of mistake, see 2 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 481-95; 3 G.
PALMER, supra note 17, at 458-61; see also Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 804 F.2d at 1493
(discussing New York law) ("It appears that any unintentional result can be catagorized as a
'mistake.'').
24. See, e.g., Central Bank & Trust Co. v. General Fin. Corp., 297 F.2d 126, 129 (5th
Cir. 1961); Bank of Naperville v. Catalano, 86 Ill. App. 3d 1005, 1008, 408 N.E.2d 441, 444
(1980); 2 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 509. Under the Restatement, a 'mistake of fact'
means any mistake except a mistake of law. A 'mistake of law' means a mistake as to the
legal consequences of an assumed state of facts." RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 7.
25. See, e.g., D. DOBBS, supra note 17, at 760-62; W. KEENER, supra note 17, at 87-91; 3
G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 11-14, 281-82, 337-43, 337 n.7, 467-77; 13 S. WILLISTON, A
TREATISE ON TBE LAW OF CoNTRAcTs §§ 1581-1582 (3d ed. 1970) ("ITihe rule... distinguishing
mistake of law from mistake of fact is founded on no sound principle." Id. at 536); Corbin,
supra note 17, at 543 n.51; Patterson, Improvements in the Law of Restitution, 40 CORNELL
L. RE v. 667, 676 (1955).
26. See, e.g., CAL. Crv. CODE §§ 1576-1578 (Deering 1971); GA. CODE ANN. § 23-2-21,
23-2-22, 23-2-27 (1982); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-03-12, 9-03-13, 9-03-14 (1987); OrLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, §§ 62-64 (West 1983); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 53-4-8, 53-4-9, 53-4-10 (1980).
27. See, e.g., W. KEENER, supra note 17, at 85; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 281, 337;
RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 45 (follows general rule); F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at
12, 55; Bohannon v. Manhattan Life Ins. Co., 555 F.2d 1205, 1212 (5th Cir. 1977) (discussing
Georgia law). Contra, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 804 F.2d at 1493 (discussing N.Y. law);
St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Pure Oil Co., 63 F.2d 771, 773 (2d Cir. 1933); Peterson
v. First Nat'l Bank, 162 Minn. 369, 375-78, 203 N.W. 53, 55-56 (1925).
It is important to note that a mistake of fact, which may result in restitution, is distinct
from what Professor Dobbs calls "conscious ignorance." D. DOBBS, supra note 17, at 718.
When a person acts knowing that he is ignorant as to certain facts, he is not mistaken as to
those facts. Id. According to the Restatement, "one who knows that he is ignorant is not
mistaken since he has no belief as to the existence or non-existence of facts." RESTATEMENT,
supra note 20, § 6 comment c. For a discussion on the effect of doubt about facts, see 2 G.
PALMER, supra note 17, at 511-14; see also Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 804 F.2d at 1494
(discussing New York law) ("conscious ignorance doctrine inapplicable" to case at bar); F.
WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 18. This conscious ignorance must be distinguished from
"unconscious disregard" of the facts which would not preclude recovery of the payment. Id.
For a discussion of the significance of this concept in the context of the mistaken payment of
checks by a bank, see infra note 230 and accompanying text.
There is authority for the point that to be the basis of restitution the mistake must not be
as to some collateral or extrinsic fact. W. KEENER, supra note 17, at 74; F. WOODWARD,
supra note 17, at 24. For a discussion on the relationship between this idea and recovery of
payments on insufficient funds checks, see W. KEENER, supra note 17, at 74-77, 79-80; F.
WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 28-30; infra notes 51-52, 115, 210 and accompanying text.
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Clearly the most problematic aspect of an action to recover mistaken
payments is that of showing it would be unjust for the defendant to retain
the money. It is in this regard that the defendant is entitled to assert
virtually any legal or equitable argument showing that it would not be
unjust to allow him to retain all or part of the money. 2 While an analysis
of all such arguments is beyond the scope of this Article, it is necessary to
consider those having particular relevance to the context of check collections.
It is generally said that negligence on the part of the plaintiff in making
the payment will not preclude restitution of the money.29 One justification
for this is that since the claim for restitution is not based on the negligence
of the defendant, the plaintiff's negligence should not preclude it.30 More-
over, according to the Restatement of Restitution, "we are not penalized
for lack of care unless this results in harm to someone else. ' 3' In a mistaken
payment case the defendant would have been benefitted by the plaintiff's
negligent act.
A defense that is generally recognized in a mistaken payments case is the
so-called change of position or change of circumstances defense.12 Ordinarily,
granting restitution to the plaintiff does not result in a loss to the defendant;
it only compels the defendant to give up a benefit received as the result of
a mistake. After restoring the benefit to the plaintiff the defendant will be
28. See, e.g., Grand Lodge v. Towne, 136 Minn. 72, 78, 161 N.W. 403, 405 (1917); Federal
Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d at 258, 333 N.E.2d at 336; Phetteplace v. Bucklin, 18 R.I. 297, 300, 27
A. 211, 212 (1893); Texas Bank & Trust Co. v. Custom Leasing, Inc., 498 S.W.2d 243, 250
(Tex. Civ. App. 1973). For a comprehensive discussion of this topic, see generally D. DOBBS,
supra note 17, at 278-80, 766-71; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 462-529; Costigan, Change
of Position as a Defense in Quasi-Contracts-The Relation of Implied Warranty and Agency
to Quasi-Contracts, 20 HAv. L. Rav. 205, 205 (1907).
29. See, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 804 F.2d at 1493 (discussing New York law); City
Nat'l Bank v. Crocker Nat'l Bank, 150 Cal. App. 3d 290, 197 Cal. Rptr. 721, 725 (1983);
Bank of Naperville, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 1008, 408 N.E.2d at 444. There are, on the other hand,
many cases where courts have been willing to deny restitution solely on the basis of the
plaintiff's negligence. See, e.g., Chase Manhattan Bank v. Burden, 489 A.2d 494, 497 (D.C.
Cir. 1985); Northern Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. at 1384-85 (in discussing where "equities lie"
court focuses on carelessness of plaintiff); Rohrville Farmers Union Elev. Co. v. Frison, 77
N.D. 235, 238, 42 N.W.2d 354, 356 (1950).
30. See, e.g., Bank of Naperville, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 1009, 408 N.E.2d at 444; D. DOBBS,
supra note 17, at 756.
31. RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 59 comment a; see also 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17,
at 462-63.
32. See, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 804 F.2d at 1493-94 (discussing New York law);
City Nat'l Bank, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 725; Bryan, 628 S.W.2d at 763; D. DOBBS, supra note 17,
at 278-80, 766-71; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 510-29; RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, §§
69, 142; Costigan, supra note 28; Note, Defense of Change of Position in Cases of Payment
Under Mistake on a Negotiable Instrument, 42 HAxv. L. REv. 411, 411 n.1 (1929) [hereinafter
Note, Defense of Change of Position]. The Restatement formulations typically include this
defense in the statement of the basis for recovery. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, §
17. Other defenses such as estoppel may be an expression of the same principle using different
terminology. See, e.g., Bank of Naperville, 86 Ill. App. 3d at 1010, 408 N.E.2d at 446 (court
refers to estoppel).
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back in the position he was in before the benefit was received, but will
clearly be no worse off as a result of the restitution. If, however, the
defendant has changed his position by losing or passing on the benefit
received, restitution will result in an actual loss to the defendant. Under
such circumstances it may be unjust to require the defendant to return the
benefit, or its equivalent, to the plaintiff.3 3 For most courts this will be the
case only when the defendant's responsibility for the mistaken payment is
no greater than the plaintiff's responsibility.3 4 Moreover, the defendant's
change of position constitutes a defense in a restitution action only when
the change was non-negligent, 3 irrevocable,3 6 and in good faith.3
7
B. Special Common Law Restitution Rules in a
Commercial Paper Context
There are a number of circumstances in which a bank's payment of a
check may be mistaken s.3  If we apply the general principles just reviewed
33. When restitution will not place the defendant back in the position he was in before
the payment was received, it may unjustly enrich the plaintiff at the expense of the defendant.
The principle that would call for restitution under some circumstances is the same principle
that will preclude restitution in others. See D. DoBns, supra note 17, at 279-80; W. KEENER,
supra note 17, at 67; Keener, supra note 17, at 222; see, e.g., City Nat'l Bank, 197 Cal. Rptr.
at 726; National Bank of Commerce v. National Mechanics' Banking Ass'n, 55 N.Y. 211, 213
(1873).
34. Costigan, supra note 28, at 212-18; Langmaid, Quasi-Contract-Change of Position by
Receipt of Money in Satisfaction of a Preexisting Obligation, 21 CAnsF. L. REv. 311, 311
(1933). This will be the case where: 1) the defendant is without fault; 2) the parties are equally
at fault; and 3) both are at fault but the defendant is less at fault. Cf. W. KEENER, supra
note 17, at 65, 67, 72; F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 38-41; Note, Effect, supra note 21,
at 805.
35. Note, Defense of Change of Position, supra note 32, at 411 n.l. For a discussion on
whether accidental loss of the benefit will preclude the change of position defense, see F.
WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 47-48.
36. City Nat'l Bank, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 721; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 512-14 & n.8;
F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 411; Langmaid, supra note 34, at 313-17.
37. 3 G. PALME R, supra note 17, at 511-12. Note that when the change in the defendant's
position is the result of consumption of the benefit by the defendant (i.e. he spent the money),
the courts generally reject it as a defense. This will be the case where the defendant spends
the money to pay personal or business debts, purchase consumer goods or entertainment, or
make gifts. This is sometimes referred to as "beneficial consumption." Id.; F. WOODWARD,
supra note 17, at 45. If, on the other hand, in light of the amount of money, the passage of
time, and the financial condition of the payee, restitution will be a significant hardship for
him, a court may allow it as a defense. D. DoBs, supra note 17, at 769-70; RESTATEMENT,
supra note 20, § 142 comment b; F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 45.
There is some support for the idea that when, as a result of receiving a benefit, the defendant
changes his life style and/or incurs expenses that would not have been incurred in the absence
of the payment, restitution would be unjust. W. KEENER, supra note 17, at 59-60. When the
change of position defense is available, the burden of proof is on the defendant. Id. at 74.
38. A bank might pay an item that is not properly payable, supra note 14, under the belief
that it is genuine and properly payable. Such a payment may be mistaken as that term is used
in the cases and commentary on quasi-contract. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
In the event the bank is forced to recredit its customer's account, supra note 14, the bank
will, in turn, seek to recover its payment from the presenting bank or another bank or party
to whom the payment was forwarded. O'Maliey, supra note 5, at 201.
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to the context of the mistaken payment of a check, the bank should be
able to obtain restitution of the payment under some circumstances unless
the defendant has a defense, such as change of position. 9 This was, in fact,
the prevailing rule in English common law prior to 1762. 40 That was the
year Lord Mansfield decided the case of Price v. Neal,41 which profoundly
unsettled the law of mistaken payments. In that case, a draft on which the
signature of the drawer was forged was mistakenly paid by the drawee to
a holder who had taken the draft for value and who had no notice of the
forgery.42 After discovering the forgery the drawee brought an action for
money had and received against the holder to obtain restitution of the
payment, but Lord Mansfield refused to allow recovery.4 3
The rule of the case is generally considered to be that when a drawee
pays or accepts an item bearing a forged drawer's signature, that payment
cannot be recovered from one who had purchased the item for value and
in good faith.44 Its supporting rationale has been extensively debated. Over
the last century alone commentators have proposed and debated as many
as ten different and sometimes conflicting justifications for the rule in the
39. In addition to an action for money had and received, a warranty action under § 3-417
or § 4-207 is the basis of recovery with certain types of mistaken payments. See, e.g., Bryan,
628 S.W.2d at 762. Moreover, a negligence action is often brought instead of, or in conjunction
with, the money action. See, e.g., City Nat'l Bank, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 723-25 (court fails to
differentiate liability under negligence with that under a money action).
We -should, however, carefully examine the concept of mistake in the context of paying
checks in the check collection system. In this context, it is probable that when a bank pays
an item in the face of doubts about the genuineness of a signature, for example, it is probably
not paying under a mistake of fact. See supra note 27. The same probably can be said in the
case of a bank that pays an item without bothering to check a signature. In such a case it
can hardly be said that the bank was mistaken as to the genuineness of the signature when it
was consciously ignorant of the matter. See also infra note 230 and accompanying text.
40. See generally Corker, Risk of Loss from Forged Indorsements: A California Problem,
4 STAN. L. REv. 24, 34 (1951); Keener, supra note 17, at 212; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 201;
Comment, Broader Liability, supra note 5, at 820 n.50; Note, Allocation, supra note 5, at
1086; Note, Doctrine, supra note 5, at 199.
41. 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762). The authority for this rule can be traced to the earlier
case of Jenys [or Jenny] v. Fawler [or Fowler], 93 Eng. Rep. 959 (K.B. 1715). Note, Doctrine,
supra note 5, at 200; see also Gloucester Bank v. Salem Bank, 17 Mass. 32, 43 (1820); Neal
v. Coburn, 92 Me. 139, 146-47, 42 A. 348, 350 (1898); Bernheimer v. Marshall & Co., 2
Minn. 61, 64 (1858); National Park Bank v. Ninth Nat'l Bank, 46 N.Y. 77, 80-81 (1871).
42. Price, 97 Eng. Rep. at 873.
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., South Boston Trust Co. v. Levin, 249 Mass. 45, 49, 143 N.E. 816, 817
(1924); Germania Bank v. Boutell, 60 Minn. 189, 191, 62 N.W. 327, 328 (1895); W. KENER,
supra note 17, at 154; 3 G. PALmER, supra note 17, at 291; F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at
127; Beasley, Liability of Drawee Bank Where a Check or Bill Has Been Materially Altered
Before Payment, Acceptance or Certification-Inability of Drawee to Recover Payment From
Holder Under Section 62 of the Negotiable Instruments Law, 10 TENN. L. REv. 87, 88 (1931);
Langmaid, supra note 34, at 346; Palmer, Negotiable Instruments Under the Commercial
Code, 48 MicH. L. REv. 255, 295 (1950); Note, Relation of Price v. Neal to the Doctrine of
Purchaser for Value Without Notice, 26 HA.v. L. REv. 634, 634 (1913) [hereinafter Note,
Relation]; Note, Allocation, supra note 5, at 1086.
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case, most of which find some measure of support in the language of Lord
Mansfield's opinion.4 Given that the rationale for Price v. Neal is unclear,
45. First, a number of courts and commentators argue that with respect to a forged
drawer's signature, the drawee is in the best position to detect the forgery and therefore should
bear the risk of a mistaken payment. See, e.g., Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pac.
Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 797, 797-98, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883, 899-90 (1978); F. WOODWARD,
supra note 17, at 137; Note, Mistaken Payment and Restitutionary Principles Under the
Commercial Code: Morgan Guaranty Trust Co. v. American Savings and Loan Association,
804 F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1986), 56 U. CIN. L. Rnv. 1075, 1090 & n.143 (1988) [hereinafter
Note, Restitutionary Principles].
Second, the recipient's change of position in reliance on the mistaken payment precludes
recovery of the payment by the drawee under this well established defense to a restitutionary
action. An early leading case focusing on this rationale is Cocks v. Masterman, 9 B. & C.
902, 908-09 (K.B. 1829). For an example of cases where this rationale is relied on, in part,
see Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. National Bank, 139 Mass. 513, 518, 2 N.E. 89, 90 (1885)
(without a change of position on the part of the recipient of the payment, the drawee can
recover a mistakenly paid insufficient funds item); see also Aigler, The Doctrine of Price v.
Neal, 24 MICH. L. Rv. 809, 813 (1926) (discussing Cocks); Beasley, supra note 44, at 89;
Note, Holder in Due Course: Case Analyzed, 36 HARv. L. Rav. 858, 859 n.8, 860 (1923)
[hereinafter Note, Holder].
Third, the rule is commonly supported by a policy of finality. Promoting certainty in
commercial transactions requires an end to the process of check collections at some point. 3
G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 291 ("perhaps the most important" among several factors);
Aigler, supra, at 811, 815, 819 (at least subconscious in Lord Mansfield's opinion and express
in later cases); O'Malley, supra note 5, at 202, 203 n.84, 227-28 & n.234 ("no expressed
support for this theory" in opinion, but by consensus is the "only satisfactory explanation");
Woodward, The Risk of Forgery or Alteration of Negotiable Instruments, 24 CoLuM. L. REv.
469, 470 (1924). For an example of this rationale being used by courts, see Fireman's Fund
Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 797-98, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 904 ("drafters recognize as the only
valid basis for the rule .... "). Related rationales are that of maintaining confidence in
commercial paper and commercial convenience, see, e.g., Germania Bank, 60 Minn. at 192-
93, 62 N.W. at 328-29; Note, Allocation of Losses from Check Forgeries Under the Law of
Negotiable Instruments and the Commercial Code, 62 YALE L.J. 417, 420 n.17 (1953) [here-
inafter Note, Losses].
Fourth, some authorities cite the drawee's negligence in paying a check as a rationale for
the rule. O'Malley, supra note 5, at 202; Note, Losses, supra, at 420 n.17, 441 n.107 (original
justification for rule, but unrealisitic under modem banking practices). For an example of a
court using negligence as a basis for the rule, see Citizens' Bank v. J. Blach & Sons, 228 Ala.
246, 249, 153 So. 404, 406 (1934). Related to the negligence rationale is the idea that the rule
encourages banks to be cautious in examining signatures. Farnsworth, Insurance Against Check
Forgery, 60 CoLum. L. REv. 284, 302 (1960) [hereinafter Farnsworth, Insurance]; Comment,
Broader Liability, supra note 5, at 825.
Fifth, some commentators, notably Ames, argue that the rule is based on the principle that
between two persons having equal equities, the one with legal title should prevail. Ames, Price
v. Neal, supra note 19, at 299-301; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 202, 203 n.85. For an example
of a court using this rationale, see Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. at 41.
Sixth, some courts and commentators suggest that the rule is justified on the basis that the
drawee is bound to know the drawer's signature and is estopped from denying its validity
once the item is paid or accepted. See First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 151 Mass. 280,
283, 24 N.E. 44, 45 (1890); American Sur. Co. v. Industrial Say. Bank, 242 Mich. 581, 584,
219 N.W. 689, 690 (1928) ("the duty of the drawee to know the signature of the drawer");
F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 129 (strongly suggested by Lord Mansfield's opinion;
"favorite explanation"); see also Lawrence, Misconceptions About Article 3 of the Commercial
Code: A Suggested Methodology and Proposed Revisions, 62 N.C.L. Rv. 115, 132 (1983)
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it is difficult to ascertain the relationship between the case and the common
law of mistaken payments. Opinions range from the view that the rule is
entirely consistent with the general rule governing recovery of mistaken
payments 46 to the view that the rule is an unjustified aberration of the law
of mistaken payments.47
Despite these uncertainties, the Price v. Neal rule was later adopted by
all but a few jurisdictions in the United States. 48 This pervasive willingness
("[T]he drawee assumes the risk of payment over the forged signature of the drawer.").
Seventh, one commentator argued that the refusal in Price v. Neal to allow recovery resulted
from a simple application of the law of mistake in that, under the facts, it was not against
good conscience for the defendant to retain the money. Aigler, supra, at 810-11; see also
Bernheimer, 2 Minn. at 81-82.
Eighth, Wigmore suggested that the refusal to refund the money in this type of case is
based on the idea that there was no mistake with respect to the drawee's duty to the holder.
Wigmore, A Summary of Quasi-Contracts, 25 AM. L. REv. 695, 706 (1891). This rationale
was more prevalent in insufficient fund cases than in other types of mistaken payments. See,
e.g., Boylston Nat'l Bank v. Richardson, 101 Mass. 287, 291 (1869).
Ninth, Keener argued that the denial of recovery ought to be based on the idea that the
defendant received money from the plaintiff in extinguishment of a right he surrendered for
the money and should not be required to return the money. W. KEENER, supra note 17, at
157.
Tenth, Professor Farnsworth argues that the rule is justified as a more efficient distribution
of losses by placing the loss on the party able to spread the loss through insurance, although
he acknowledges that this idea was not part of Lord Mansfield's opinion. Farnsworth,
Insurance, supra, at 302-03.
Courts typically rely on more than one of these rationales. See, e.g., Commercial & Farmers
Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 30 Md. 11 (1869). The confusion over the rationale for the
decision may result, in part, from errors in reporting Lord Mansfield's remarks from the
bench. The court in Ellis & Morton, 4 Ohio St. at 628, remarked that the opinion "is not
very clearly reported," and then declined to advance its own views on the rationale for the
holding. Id. at 653. Professor Palmer suggests that "[s]ome of the disagreement stems from
the common error of assuming that the decision rested on a single overriding policy, whereas
in fact it probably was a response to several factors." 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 291.
46. Aigler, supra note 45, at 810-11 ("[U]nder the facts it was not against good conscience
for the defendant-holder, to whom the drawee ... had paid the money called for, to retain
it."); Beasley, supra note 44, at 91-92.
47. First Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Wyndmere, 15 N.D. 229, 305, 108 N.W. 546, 549 (1906)
(the court characterizes the doctrine as "unsound"); American Express Co. v. State Nat'l
Bank, 27 Okla. 824, 827, 113 P. 711, 712 (1911) (the doctrine is "unsound and illogical");
First Nat'l Bank v. Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank, 146 S.W. 1034, 1035 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912) ("[T]he magic name of Mansfield has not been sufficient to render perpetual the heresy
taught by him .... ); W. KEENER, supra note 17, at 154 n.1; Beasley, supra note 44, at 89.
48. See, e.g., Bank of the United States v. Bank of Ga., 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 333, 348-52
(1825) ("The case of Neal v. Price [sic] has never since been departed from; and ... it has
had the uniform support of the Court, and has been deemed a satisfactory authority.");
Commercial & Farmers Nat'l Bank, 30 Md. at 19 ("authority of the case ... has been
uniformly and abundently sustained"); Gloucester Bank, 17 Mass. at 43; Neal v. Coburn, 92
Me. at 147, 42 A. at 350-51; American Sur. Co., 242 Mich. at 584 ("The great majority of
American courts have in the final analysis followed the doctrine of Price v. Neal .... );
Germania Bank, 60 Minn. at 191, 62 N.W. at 328 ("This general doctrine is recognized as
the law by the courts of every state in the Union except Pennsylvania . . . ."); National Park
Bank, 46 N.Y. at 81; Bank of Williamson v. McDowell County Bank, 66 W. Va. 553, 550,
66 S.E. 761, 764 (1909) (court acknowledges criticism, but adheres to the rule calling it
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of courts to adopt the Price v. Neal rule must be compared, however, with
their reluctance to expand the rule beyond the facts of the case. Protection
from the drawee's restitutionary action was generally available only to
holders who paid value for the draft and who were acting in good faith at
the time payment was received.49 In addition, protection was denied to
holders who were negligent in originally obtaining the instrument or
the payment.5 0 The only notable expansion of the rule was to the mis-
taken payment of checks drawn on insufficient funds51 and no account
"indispensable"). Contra Bank of Wyndmere, 15 N.D. at 305, 108 N.W. at 546 (court
characterizes the doctrine as "unsound"); American Express Co., 27 Okla. at 827, 113 P. at
712 (doctrine is "unsound and illogical"); Farmers' & Merchants' State Bank, 146 S.W. at
1035 ("[T]he magic name of Mansfield has not been sufficient to render perpetual the heresy
taught by him ... ."). In both the Bank of Wyndmere case and the American Express Co.
case the courts would allow, under the traditional law of mistake, the recipient's good faith,
non-negligent change of position in reliance on the mistaken payment to preclude recovery by
the drawee. In 1849, Pennsylvania enacted a statute abolishing the Price v. Neal rule. PA.
STAT. ANm. tit. 426, § 10 (Purdon 1853); see Union Nat'l Bank v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 249
Pa. 375, 94 A. 1085 (1915); see also 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 292; Aiger, supra note
45, at 816-17; Ames, Price v. Neal, supra note 19, at 297-98; Beasley, supra note 44, at 87
("well settled rule"); O'Malley, supra note 5, at 202 ("an instantaneous and apparently
permanent success"); Steinheimer, Impact of the Commercial Code on Liability of Parties to
Negotiable Instruments in Michigan, 53 MIcH. L. REy. 171, 209-10 (1954).
49. See, e.g, Commercial & Say. Bank Co. v. Citizens' Nat'l Bank, 68 Ind. App. 417,
425, 120 N.E. 670, 672 (1918); Bank of St. Albans v. Farmers & Mechanics Bank, 10 Vt.
141, 147 (1838); see also 3 G. PAT.MR, supra note 17, at 292; Aigler, supra note 45, at 821-
23 (protection should be denied to holders who were in complicity with the forger); Ames,
Price v. Neal, supra note 19, at 301; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 204-05.
50. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank, 151 Mass. at 283-84, 24 N.E. at 45; Germania Bank, 60
Minn. at 193, 62 N.W. at 329 ("[T]he trend of the modem authorities is to impose upon [the
rule] some limitations and modifications."); Ellis & Morton, 4 Ohio St. at 652; People's Bank
v. Franklin Bank, 88 Tenn. 299, 302-03, 12 S.W. 716, 716-17 (1889); Bank of Williamson, 66
W. Va. at 550-52, 66 S.E. at 763-65; see also First Nat'l City Bank v. Altman, 3 U.C.C. Rep.
Serv. (Callaghan) 815, 816-17 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) (the Price v. Neal rule does not apply in
a case where the defendant purchaser was negligent in obtaining the instrument). Contra
Bernheimer, 2 Minn. at 85; National Park Bank, 46 N.Y. at 81-82; see also W. KEENER, supra
note 17, at 154 n.1; Aigler, supra note 45, at 820-21, 823; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 205 &
n.93.
In most cases the holder's negligence was the failure to obtain proper identification from a
stranger before taking a check. See, e.g., People's Bank, 88 Tenn. at 303-04, 12 S.W. at 717.
But see Bank of St. Albans, 10 Vt. at 147-48 (the failure to obtain proper identification did
not preclude protection under the rule); O'Malley, supra note 5, at 205 n.93. The drawee's
negligence may excuse the defendant's negligence. See, e.g., Woods v. Colony Bank, 114 Ga.
683, 687, 40 S.E. 720, 722 (1902). Contra People's Bank, 88 Tenn. at 302-03, 12 S.W. at 717.
The plaintiff's negligence was generally not relevant unless it prejudiced the defendant. See,
e.g., First Nat'l Bank, 151 Mass. at 284, 24 N.E. at 45; Note, Effect, supra note 21, at 805
(plaintiff, even if negligent, can recover if his act has not changed the position of an innocent
defendant to his detriment).
51. See, e.g., Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank v. Swift, 70 Md. 515, 518, 17 A. 336, 337 (1889);
Boylston Nat'l Bank, 101 Mass. at 290-91; Spokane & Eastern Trust Co. v. Huff, 63 Wash.
225, 226, 115 P. 80, 81 (1911). But see Merchants' Nat'l Bank v. National Eagle Bank, 101
Mass. 281, 285 (1869) (the recovery of a mistakenly paid insufficient funds item allowed unless
the recipient had changed position in reliance on the payment); see also W. KEENER, supra
1990]
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checks.5 2 In these situations, as in the case of a forged drawer's signature,
the payment was final and could not be recovered by the drawee so long
as the holder was acting in good faith, was not negligent, and had taken
the instrument for value.53 On the other hand, in cases involving other types
of mistaken payments, such as payment of an item bearing a forged
indorsement, or fraudulent, material alteration, the courts refused to extend
Price v. Neal.14 Accordingly, in such cases restitution remained available to
note 17, at 77; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 300-01, 300 n.44; Ames, Price v. Neal, supra
note 19, at 305; Keener, supra note 17, at 214; Langmaid, supra note 34, at 346 n.124;
Woodward, supra note 45, at 474.
The rationale for such an extension is clear. Essentially all of the arguments for finality in
a forged drawer situation apply with equal force to an insufficient funds situation. See, e.g.,
Manufacturers' Nat'l Bank, 70 Md. at 520-21, 17 A. at 337; Germania Bank, 60 Minn. at
193, 62 N.W. at 329; Liberty Trust Co. v. Haggerty, 92 N.J. Eq. 609, 612-13, 113 A. 596,
597-98 (N.J. Ch. 1921), aff'd sub nom. Liberty Trust co. v. Ford, 93 N.J. Eq. 198, 115 A.
926 (1921) (per curiam) (no mistake made and finality of transactions); Spokane & Eastern
Trust Co., 63 Wash. at 226-29, 115 P. at 81-82; see also 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 300-
01, 300 n.44; RESTATEMENT, supra note 20, § 33.
52. O'Malley, supra note 5, at 202 n.79. But see Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Diamond,
17 Misc. 2d 909, 186 N.Y.S.2d 917 (N.Y. App. Term. 1959).
53. See, e.g., Ames, Price v. Neal, supra note 19, at 305; Keener, supra note 17, at 214.
The rule was also extended to notes, both as to a forged maker's signature and altered
amounts. See, e.g., Bank of the United States, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 355; Gloucester Bank,
17 Mass. at 43; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 299 n.40.
The application of the rule to both payment and acceptance does not constitute an expansion
of the rule because Price v. Neal involved two drafts, one paid and the other accepted. See,
e.g., National Park Bank, 46 N.Y. at 81; First Nat'l Bank v. United States Nat'l Bank, 100
Or. 264, 279-80, 197 P. 547, 552-53 (1921); Levy v. Bank of the United States, 1 Binn. 27,
35 (Pa. 1802); Bank of St. Albans, 10 Vt. at 145.
54. With respect to forged indorsements, see National Park Bank, 46 N.Y. at 81; W.
KEENER, supra note 17, at 154 n.l; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 283; Corker, supra note
40, at 24; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 228; Woodward, supra note 45, at 474-76. The same
rule applied in cases of a forged indorsement on a note. 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 285
& n.19.
The rationale for refusing to extend the Price v. Neal rule to cases involving forged
indorsements is typically that the party dealing with the forger is in the best position to detect
that type of forgery. See, e.g., Canal Bank v. Bank of Albany, I Hill 287, 293 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 1841); Bank of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 241-42, 548 P.2d
563, 566 (1976).
With respect to material alterations, see Espy v. Bank of Cincinnati, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.)
604, 619 (1873); Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co. v. Bank of Italy, 214 Cal. 156, 160,
4 P.2d 781, 783 (1931); Parke v. Roser, 67 Ind. 500, 503 (1879); National Bank of Commerce
v. National Mechanics' Banking Ass'n, 55 N.Y. 211, 216-17 (1873); Clews v. Bank of N.Y.
Nat'l Banking Ass'n, 89 N.Y. 418, 422 (1882); see also W. KEENER, supra note 17, at 154
n.1; 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 296; Farnsworth, Insurance, supra note 45, at 309 &
n.127 (split of authority); O'Malley, supra note 5, at 261. If a materially altered item was
accepted, the drawee was liable only in the original amount. 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at
296. If the item was paid, the drawee could recover the difference between the original amount
and the altered amount. Id; see also O'Malley, supra note 5, at 261.
Although restitution remained available in cases of materially altered drafts, courts followed
Price v. Neal in cases of materially altered notes on the rationale that makers were "bound
to know [their] own notes."' Bank of the United States, 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) at 351; see also
3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 299 & n.40.
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the drawee through an action for money had and received, subject, however,
to the traditional defenses such as change of position."
Looking at the law governing the recovery of mistaken payments of
checks and other drafts at the end of the nineteenth century, it is clear that
the great weight of authority called for the application of quasi-contract
principles to allow restitution in cases of forged indorsements, material
alterations, and other circumstances that did not fall within the Price v.
Neal rule. At the same time, however, some courts began developing
alternative theories of recovery in mistaken payment cases. Some of these
were to change fundamentally the law of recovering mistaken payments.
The most significant of these alternative theories of recovery originated
in the practice of a few courts implying a warranty of good title from the
act of presenting for payment (or acceptance).56 Under this approach, a
holder who presented an item bearing a forged indorsement did not have
good title and was, therefore, in breach of warranty and obligated to refund
the payment. Inasmuch as the presence of a forged drawer's signature did
not affect good title to the item,57 the distinction between these types of
forgeries that existed under quasi-contract principles was preserved under
the implied warranty theory.58 Over the last hundred years commentators
55. 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 283-84, 297; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 228-29, 261;
Rogers, The Irrelevance of Negotiable Instruments Concepts in the Law of the Check-Based
Payment System, 65 TEx. L. REv. 929, 956 & n.84 (1987) (recovery with respect to forged
indorsements rested on a simple restitutionary analysis with a common law action in assumpsit);
Steinheimer, supra note 48, at 209-11.
A holder who in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment will not be required
to return the payment to the drawee so long as the holder is not more responsible than the
drawee for the mistake. See, e.g., National Park Bank v. Seaboard Bank, 114 N.Y. 28, 33-
35, 20 N.E. 632, 633-34 (1889) (a change of position precluded the recovery of an altered item
mistakenly paid); see also Rogers, supra, at 956 n.84 (disclosed agent defense); Note, Defense
of Change of Position, supra note 32, at 411-13.
Following the general common law rule, the negligence of the drawee in paying the instrument
typically did not preclude recovery of the payment in a case falling outside of the Price v.
Neal rule. F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at 143. If, however, the drawee is negligent in failing
to give prompt notice of the forgery after its discovery, the drawee cannot recover the payment
from a defendant who was prejudiced by the delay. Id.
56. See, e.g., Leather Mfrs.' Bank v. Merchants' Bank, 128 U.S. 26, 35 (1888); Merchants'
Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 3 F. 66, 67 (C.C.D. Md. 1880); see also 3 G. PALMER, supra
note 17, at 283; Corker, supra note 40, at 34; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 228, 261; Rogers,
supra note 55, at 956 n.84; Steinheimer, supra note 48, at 209-11.
57. See, e.g., Germania Bank, 60 Minn. at 195, 62 N.W. at 329; Bank of Williamson, 66
W. Va. at 552-53, 66 S.E. at 764; see also Sun 'n Sand, Inc. v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal.
3d 671, 684-87, 582 P.2d 920, 929-32, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 338-41 (1978); North Carolina Nat'l
Bank v. M. T. Hammond, 298 N.C. 703, 710, 260 S.E.2d 617, 623 (1979) (the warranty of
good title refers only to the validity of the chain of indorsements; presumably, the court meant
that all indorsements necessary to the chain of title must be authentic). See generally J. Wmm
& R. SuMMERS, HANDBOOK OF Tm LAW UNDER Tm CoMRtIAL CODE 609 (2d ed. 1980);
Whaley, Forged Indorsements and the UCC's "Holder," 6 IND. L. REv. 45 (1972).
58. This warranty was sometimes viewed as a warranty of genuineness with respect to
signatures, and, for a majority of courts, this warranty did not encompass the drawer's
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have heavily criticized this development.5 9 Despite the criticism, the implied
warranty of title persisted in mistaken payment cases, albeit as a minority
view . 0 In some cases it was relied upon as the sole basis of recovery;6 in
other cases it was a basis of recovery in addition to quasi-contract princi-
ples. 6 2
There was a parallel development in cases where a fraudulently and
materially altered item was mistakenly paid. While the large majority of
courts allowed recovery under quasi-contract principles, a few courts allowed
recovery under a warranty of genuineness implied in the presentment. 63 This
development was subject to the same criticism as the development of
warranty in cases of forged indorsements.
The end of the nineteenth century brought the formation of the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (N.C.C.U.S.L.) and
the organized movement toward uniform state laws. 64 The first project of
the N.C.C.U.S.L. was the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.),
promulgated in 1896 and eventually adopted in all states. 65 Inasmuch as the
signature. See, e.g., Bernheimer, 2 Minn. at 84 (the presenting party does not warrant the
genuineness of the drawer's signature); First Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 58 Ohio St. 207,
215-16, 50 N.E. 723, 725 (1898). There were, however, some important consequences that
resulted from the adoption of the warranty theory of recovery. See infra notes 81-83 and
accompanying text; Note, Losses, supra note 45, at 420.
59. While courts had previously developed the notion of an implied warranty of good title
in the transfer and negotiation of an instrument, critics saw as illegitimate the effort to extend
this warranty to the presentment of the instrument for payment. W. KEENER, supra note 17,
at 143 n.1; see also 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 283; F. WOODWARD, supra note 17, at
128; Ames, Price v. Neal, supra note 19, at 301-02; Steinheimer, supra note 48, at 210 n.195.
A presentment for payment is not a negotiation, and a holder making a presentment is not in
the same position as a bargainer in a negotiation. See Neal v. Coburn, 92 Me. at 150, 42 A.
at 351-52; Ames, Price v. Neal, supra note 19, at 301-02. Accordingly, warranties relevant to
one should not attach to the other.
60. J. WrnE & R. SummERs, supra note 57, at 598 & n.43; O'Malley, supra note 5, at
228-29.
61. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363, 368 & n.3 (1943);
Security Say. Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 106 F.2d 542, 544-45 (6th Cir. 1939).
62. See, e.g., Leather Mfrs.' Bank, 128 U.S. at 38; People's Bank, 88 Tenn. at 299, 12
S.W. at 716.
63. See, e.g., Interstate Trust Co. v. United States Nat'l Bank, 67 Colo. 6, 7-10, 185 P.
260, 260-61 (1919), rev'd, American Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 130 Colo. 557, 563-64,
277 P.2d 951, 954-55 (1954); City Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 45 Tex. 203, 217 (1876). Here
the warranty of good title would not apply. See Note, Defense of Change of Position, supra
note 32, at 414 & n.23.
64. See generally L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 403-11, 674-75 (2d ed.
1985); Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships Under the Commercial Code-Part
I: The Methodological Problem and The Civil Law Approach, 31 ARK. L. Rnv. 1, 12 (1977)
[hereinafter Nickles I].
65. NEG OTABLE INsTRUMENTs LAW, 3A U.L.A. 479 (1981) [hereinafter N.I.L.]; see J.
Wmmr & R. SusmMRs, supra note 57, at 2-3; Nickles, Problems of Sources of Law Relationships
Under the Commercial Code-Part II: The English Approach and A Solution to the Meth-
odological Problem, 31 ARK. L. REv. 171, 218 n.311 (1977) [hereinafter Nickles II]. The
N.I.L. can be found in 3A U.L.A. 479 (1981). References to the N.I.L. herein are to the
N.I.L. Ann. (1920), which was replaced by article 3 of the Code. R.U.C.C. Prefatory Note i;
L. FRMDMAN, supra note 64, at 408; D. WHALEY, supra note 8, at 2.
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N.I.L. is the statutory predecessor of article 3 of the Code, it is useful to
briefly examine how it dealt with the problem of recovering mistaken
payments.
C. Recovery of Mistaken Payments Under the Uniform
Negotiable Instruments Law
Although the N.I.L. gave no explicit recognition to the Price v. Neal
rule, the courts in an overwhelming majority of jurisdictions found that the
Price v. Neal rule was incorporated into the N.I.L. For most courts the
vehicle for retaining the rule was section 626 which provided that by
accepting the instrument the acceptor admits the genuineness of the drawer's
signature. 67 This admission precluded a claim by the drawee that the payment
was mistakenly made over a forged drawer's signature, thereby preserving
the result in Price v. Neal.6 A few courts brought the Price v. Neal rule
into the N.I.L. through section 196 as a supplementary common law
principle.69 Through one approach or the other, the rule in Price v. Neal
became firmly established under the N.I.L., although disputes continued
over whether finality of payment was limited to cases where the recipient
was a holder in due course70 and whether a negligent recipient was entitled
66. N.I.L. § 62 (1920); see, e.g., American Hominy Co., 273 F. at 556; National Bank v.
First Nat'l Bank, 141 Mo. App. 719, 729-30, 125 S.W. 513, 516 (1910); Banca Commerciale
Italiana Trust Co. v. Clarkson, 274 N.Y. 69, 72-73, 8 N.E.2d 281, 282 (1937); United States
Nat'! Bank, 100 Or. at 287-88, 197 P. at 552-53; Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Planenscheck,
200 Wis. 304, 305-06, 227 N.W. 387, 388-89 (1929); see also Aigler, supra note 45, at 818;
Beasley, supra note 44, at 91-93; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 202-05; Palmer, supra note 44,
at 295. There was, on the other hand, some doubt as to whether N.I.L. § 62 was intended to
codify Price v. Neal. See Steinheimer, supra note 48, at 207.
67. N.I.L. § 62(1).
68. Notice, however, that according to the language of the section the admission is deemed
to be made only in cases of acceptance of an instrument. Most courts simply extended this
concept to encompass payment, thereby precluding recovery there as well. See, e.g., Title
Guar. & Trust Co. v. Haven, 126 A.D. 802, 804-05, 111 N.Y.S. 305, 307 (1908); Commerce-
Guardian Bank v. Toledo Trust Co., 60 Ohio App. 337, 21 N.E.2d 173 (1938) (payment
includes acceptance); Fidelity & Cas. Co., 200 Wis. at 305-06, 227 N.W. at 388-89. But see
Union Nat'l Bank v. Franklin Nat'l Bank, 249 Pa. 375, 94 A. 1085 (1915); see also 3 G.
PALMER, supra note 17, at 292; Palmer, supra note 44, at 295 n.147.
69. See, e.g., South Boston Trust Co. v. Levin, 249 Mass. 45, 143 N.E. 816, 817 (1924);
see also Aigler, supra note 45, at 818. N.I.L. § 196 provided: "In any case not provided for
in this act the rules of [law and equity including] the law merchant shall govern." N.I.L. §
196. This section is the statutory predecessor of U.C.C. § 1-103. U.C.C. § 1-103 Official
Comment (Prior Statutory Provision); Hillman, Construction of the Commercial Code: UCC
Section 1-103 and "Code" Methodology, 18 B.C. INDus. & COM. L. Ray. 655, 659 n.21
(1977).
70. See, e.g., American Sur. Co. v. Industrial Say. Bank, 242 Mich. 581, 587-89, 219
N.W. 689, 691 (1928) (Price v. Neal followed, but recovery of mistaken payment allowed
because recipient was not a holder in due course).
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to protection.71
With respect to recovery of payments over forged indorsements and
material alterations under the N.I.L., an overwhelming majority of courts
continued to adhere to quasi-contract principles allowing recovery of the
payment unless the recipient changed his position in reliance on the payment
or could assert some other affirmative defense;7 2 however, the erosion of
the dominant quasi-contract approach accelerated under the N.I.L. The
N.I.L. sections 65 and 66 codified the common law transfer warranty of
genuineness and good title.7 3 This warranty was, by the terms of the statute,
made only in the transfer and negotiation process, and most courts limited
the application of the warranty accordingly. 74 However, a persistent and
apparently growing minority of courts extended this warranty from the
transfer and negotiation process to the presentment process .71 This was
heavily criticized as inappropriate on the grounds that a presentment is not
a negotiation and a signature by the presenter is not an indorsement. 76
Some courts, unwilling to extend the N.I.L. transfer warranties to the
presentment process, continued to find a warranty implied in that process
as they had done at common law. 77 Thus, under either an implied warranty
theory or the extension of a statutory warranty, the drawee that paid an
item bearing a forged indorsement could recover the payment from the
recipient.
With respect to the recovery of payments made on altered items, the
prevailing view under the N.I.L. was that such payments could be recov-
71. A substantial majority of courts held that the recipient's negligence will preclude
protection under the rule. See, e.g., Citizens' Bank v. J. Blach & Sons, Inc., 228 Ala. 246,
250, 153 So. 404, 408 (1934); Kansas Bankers Sur. Co. v. Ford County State Bank, 184 Kan.
529, 538-39, 338 P.2d 309, 317 (1959); American Sur. Co., 242 Mich. at 586, 219 N.W. at
690-91. But see Fidelity & Casualty Co., 200 Wis. at 304, 227 N.W. at 387 (negligence of the
holder does not preclude protection under the rule).
72. See, e.g., United States Nat'l Bank, 100 Or. at 290-92, 197 P. at 556; 3 G. PALMER,
supra note 17, at 283.
73. N.I.L. §§ 65, 66; Cohen, supra note 19, at 1348 n.45; Note, Defense of Change of
Position, supra note 32, at 412.
74. See, e.g., American Hominy Co., 273 F. at 555; Louisa Nat'l Bank v. Kentucky Nat'l
Bank, 239 Ky. 302, 308-10, 39 S.W.2d 497, 499-500 (1931); see also Corker, supra note 40,
at 34 n.27; Rogers, supra note 55, at 956 n.84.
75. See, e.g., Security Say. Bank, 106 F.2d at 545; American Exch. Nat'l Bank v. Yorkville
Bank, 122 Misc. 616, 621, 204 N.Y.S. 621, 626 (Sup. Ct. 1924); O'Malley, supra note 5, at
228; Palmer, supra note 44, at 299 n.165 (cites considerable uncertainty as to whom warranties
run).
76. See, e.g., Security Say. Bank, 106 F.2d at 545 (acknowledges criticism); United States
Nat'l Bank, 100 Or. at 289-90, 197 P. at 555-56; see also Corker, supra note 40, at 34 n.27;
Farnsworth, Insurance, supra note 45, at 310; Rogers, supra note 55, at 957 n.84. For a
discussion of the presentment warranty under common law, see supra notes 56-63 and
accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Clearfield Trust Co., 318 U.S. at 368-69 (discussing federal law); Note,
Losses, supra note 45, at 422 n.21; supra notes 56-63 and accompanying text.
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ered.78 For most courts, this result was reached through the application of
quasi-contract principles. 79 Some courts, however, allowed for the recovery
of altered items under a warranty action. 80
We can see from this survey of pre-Code law (both common law and the
N.I.L.) that recovery of the payment of an item with a forged indorsement
was widely available; recovery in a case of material alteration was less so.
In cases of a forged drawer's signature, finality of payment under the Price
v. Neal rule was nearly universal, but the availability of its protection was
restricted. The rule was extended only to items drawn on insufficient funds
and no account items.8' The dominant theory or basis of recovery or its
denial was quasi-contract, but the alternative implied warranty theory, which
was established at common law, continued under the N.I.L. It was com-
plimented by the extension of the N.I.L. statutory warranty to the present-
ment process.
It must be emphasized that although quasi-contract and warranty were
alternative theories of recovering mistaken payments, as they developed, the
similarity between them became increasingly superficial. They both retained
the same general treatment of the different types of mistaken payments.
78. See, e.g., Central Nat'l Bank v. F.W. Drosten Jewelry Co., 203 Mo. App. 646, 657-
59, 220 S.W. 511, 514 (1920); National Reserve Bank v. Corn Exch. Bank, 171 A.D. 195, 157
N.Y.S. 316 (N.Y. App. Div. 1916).
79. See, e.g., Wells Fargo Bank & Union Trust Co., 214 Cal. at 164-66, 4 P.2d at 785
(construing N.I.L. § 62); McClendon v. Bank of Advance, 188 Mo. App. 417, 425-27, 174
S.W. 203, 205 (1915).
80. The use of an implied warranty of genuineness theory still persisted among some
courts. O'Malley, supra note 5, at 261. For an example of a case in which the court finds
that the N.I.L. statutory warranties preempt the implied warranties, see Kansas Bankers Sur.
Co., 184 Kan. at 536-37, 338 P.2d at 315-16. Other courts were willing to extend the statutory
transfer warranty of genuineness to the presentment process and allow for recovery of altered
items on that basis. See, e.g., Seaboard Sur. Co. v. First Nat'l City Bank, 15 Misc. 2d 816,
817-18, 180 N.Y.S.2d 156, 157-58 (N.Y. City Ct. 1958).
It should be noted that the tendency of courts to deny recovery of a payment on an altered
item was greater under the N.I.L. than under the common law. Under § 62, a drawee who
had accepted an altered item was bound to pay it to a holder as accepted; that is, in the
altered amount. See, e.g., National City Bank v. National Bank, 300 Ill. 103, 132 N.E. 832
(1921). This view, which some courts limited to acceptance, while others extended it to payment
(see, e.g., Kansas Bankers Surety Co., 184 Ran. at 533-34, 537, 338 P.2d at 313, 316) was
prevalent among a minority of courts, and received significant support from commentators.
See, e.g., National City Bank, 300 Ill. at 108-09, 132 N.E. at 833-34. Contra McClendon, 188
Mo. App. at 426-28, 174 S.W. at 205 (N.I.L. § 62 does not preclude recovery of the mistaken
payment of a materially altered item); Beasley, supra note 44, at 93-94. As a result of this
section, the implied warranty theory, the extended statutory warranty, and the application of
quasi-contract principles, there existed considerable uncertainty under the N.I.L. over the
recovery of payments on altered items.
81. See, e.g, Central Bank & Trust Co. v. General Fin. Corp., 297 F.2d 126, 129-30 (5th
Cir. 1961) (under N.I.L., no restitution of payment for insufficient funds item). But see
Mechanics Nat'l Bank v. Worcester County Trust Co., 341 Mass. 465, 471-73, 170 N.E.2d
476, 480-81 (1960) (allowing restitution of payment on insufficient funds item because of
negligence of defendant).
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However, under warranty, the plaintiff no longer had to show unjust
enrichment on the part of the defendant.12 In addition, the change of
position and other defenses of an equitable nature were discarded under
the warranty theory, resulting in it becoming a distinct theory of recovery.83
The provisions of the N.I.L. governed the recovery of mistaken payments
until the development of the Code in the middle of this century. The next
section of this Article will examine recovery of mistaken payments under
the Code, focusing on whether and to what extent common law restitution
survived the adoption of the Code.
III. RECOVERY OF MISTAKEN PAYMENTS UNDER THE UhnORM
COMMERCIAL CODE
A. Displacement of the Common Law Under
U.C.C. Section 1-103
The process of determining the extent to which a common law restitu-
tionary action has survived the enactment of the U.C.C. must begin with
section 1-103. It provides in relevant part: "Unless displaced by the partic-
ular provisions of this Act, the principles of law and equity, including...
the law relative to ... mistake ... shall supplement its provisions." '
Under the language of this section, the common law governing cases of
mistaken payments, especially the action for money had and received, will
supplement the Code provisions (including the Code remedies) unless it has
been displaced by the "particular" provisions of the Code. The crucial issue
here, of course, is determining the meaning of "displaced." Some courts
subscribe to the view that the common law can only be expressly displaced.8 5
82. Steinheimer, supra note 48, at 207; Note, Allocation, supra note 5, at 1080.
83. See Farnsworth, Insurance, supra note 45, at 310; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 263;
Note, Defense of Change of Position, supra note 32, at 412. The distinction between restitution
and warranty as bases of recovery becomes more apparent under the Code.
84. U.C.C. § 1-103 (1989) (emphasis added). For a discussion on the operation of § 1-103,
see generally Hillman, supra note 69; Nickles I, supra note 64, at 47-53; Nickles II, supra
note 65; Summers, General Equitable Principles Under Section 1-103 of the Commercial Code,
72 Nw. U.L. Rnv. 906 (1978).
85. See, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co. v. American Say. & Loan Ass'n, 804 F.2d 1487,
1495 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 929 (1987); Demos v. Lyons, 151 N.J. Super.
489, 499, 376 A.2d 1352, 1357 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1977) ("Legislative intent to change
the common law must be clearly and plainly expressed. Section 4-213(1) cannot displace
common law restitution by implication from silence." (citations omitted)); Hechter v. New
York Life Ins. Co., 46 N.Y.2d 34, 39, 412 N.Y.S.2d 812, 815 (1978). This extreme view finds
support in comment 1 to § 1-103 which reads, in part: "[this section indicates the continued
applicability to commercial contracts of all supplemental bodies of law except insofar as they
are explicitly displaced by this Act .... ." U.C.C. § 1-103 Official Comment 1 (emphasis
added). It also finds support in the principle of statutory construction that statutes in derogation
of the common law are to be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Norfolk Redev. & Hous. Auth.
v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464 U.S. 30, 35-36 (1983); Hechter, 46 N.Y.2d at 39,
412 N.Y.S.2d at 815; see also Nickles II, supra note 65, at 202 & n.252, 224 & n.334.
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Because instances of express displacement of common law are relatively rare
under articles 3 and 4 of the Code,8 6 the concept of implied displacement
becomes central to the issue.
Most of the cases where the courts have found that the Code had impliedly
displaced the common law involved inconsistencies between the common
law and the language of the Code. 87 For these courts, to the extent that
there were such inconsistencies, section 1-103 requires that the Code sections
prevail, but otherwise the common law survives. "Implied" in this context
operates essentially as a matter of logical necessity in the context of the
statutory language. Under this approach, the common law survives so long
as that result is not logically inconsistent with the language of the Code.88
Some courts hold a much more expansive view of the concept of dis-
placement. For these courts, the focus is on the broader policies and
purposes of the Code or of a statutory scheme within the Code. 89 Under
this view, the Code may displace the common law rules even though there
are no inconsistencies between the common law and the language of the
Code. Although this approach entails the difficulty of ascertaining the
Code's purposes and policies, it seems to be more consistent with the
command of section 1-102 that the Code "shall be liberally construed and
applied to promote its underlying purposes and policies."' 9
86. Those that can be found are in the official comments rather than the Code sections.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 3-418 Official Comment (1978) ("The section rejects decisions under the
[N.I.L.] ..... "); id. § 3-415 Official Comment ("Subsection (5) is intended to change the result
of such decisions as .... "); see also id. § 2-206 Official Comment ("Former technical rules
as to acceptance, ... are rejected . . ").
87. See, e.g., Perini Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank, 553 F.2d 398, 416 (5th Cir. 1977) ("The
UCC ... displaces common law causes of action only to the extent they are inconsistent with
the provisions of the Code."); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. City Nat'l Bank, 149 Cal. App. 3d 60,
69, 196 Cal. Rptr. 614, 620 (1983); Bryan v. Citizens Nat'l Bank, 628 S.W.2d 761, 764 (Tex.
1982); Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. First City Bank, 675 S.W.2d 316, 319 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984).
88. In other words, if a particular cause of action existed at common law under particular
circumstances and, under the Code, a modified form of the cause of action is available under
identical circumstances, one could say that the Code has impliedly changed the common law.
On the other hand, in the absence of any logical inconsistencies between the common law and
the Code, the common law survives. See, e.g., E.F. Hutton & Co., 149 Cal. App. 3d at 69,
196 Cal. Rptr. at 620. Professor Robert Summers subscribes to a narrow view of displacement,
Summers, supra note 84, at 935-39; however, he would allow policy considerations to justify
displacement in some cases.
89. See, e.g., New Jersey Bank, N.A. v. Bradford Sec. Operations, 690 F.2d 339, 345-47
(3d Cir. 1982); Great W. Bank & Trust v. Nahat, 138 Ariz. 260, 265, 674 P.2d 323, 326-28
(1983); Brannon v. First Nat'l Bank, 137 Ga. App. 275, 278, 223 S.E.2d 473, 476 (1976);
Consolidated Pub. Water Supply Dist. v. Farmers Bank, 686 S.W.2d 844, 852-53 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1985).
90. U.C.C. § 1-102. The expansive approach also has the support of some commentators.
See R. Hum&AN, J. McDoNNELL & S. NIcKIT.s, ComaoN LAW AND EQurry UNDER THE
CO ERCIAL CODE, 1.0412] (1985); Hillman, supra note 69; Nickles II, supra note 65, at
225-30 (expansive approach proper when the result is consistent with Code purposes and
policies).
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Whether and to what extent a common law restitutionary action has
survived the enactment of the U.C.C. depends, in large part, on which view
of displacement is followed. It also depends, of course, on an analysis of
the language of the relevant Code sections and under the expansive view,
the underlying policies and purposes of the Code as it relates to check
collections and recovery of mistaken payments. Inasmuch as the narrow
view of displacement is followed by a majority of courts, the availability
of common law restitution under that view will be addressed first.
B. Restitution Within the Code Under the
Narrow View of Displacement
Neither article 3 nor article 4 expressly adopts or codifies quasi-contract
principles as the general basis of recovery of mistaken payments. Instead,
a warranty theory, which was the minority view in pre-Code law, is adopted
as the basis for recovery under section 3-4171' and its counterpart in article
4, section 4-207.92 These sections provide for certain warranties in the
presentment of an item for payment or acceptance. 93 The types of mistaken
payments that will trigger a breach of warranty and allow recovery of the
payment are basically the same as those which, at common law, would
allow recovery of the payment under quasi-contract principles.9 Moreover,
the exceptions to the warranty provisions are parallel to the common law
as well. Of special significance is the fact that there is no warranty of
91. U.C.C. § 3-417; see also 3 G. PA~mmR, supra note 17, at 283; Farnsworth, A General
Survey of Article 3 and an Examination of Two Aspects of Codification, 44 TEx. L. Rar.
645, 654-55 (1966) [hereinafter Farnsworth, General Survey]; O'Malley, supra note 5, at 229-
30, 262-63.
92. U.C.C. § 4-207; see also North Carolina Nat'l Bank v. Hammond, 298 N.C. 703, 707,
260 S.E.2d 617, 621-22 (1979); Rogers, supra note 55, at 956 (article 4 uses warranty of good
title approach); Note, Allocation, supra note 5.
93. The basic warranties are that the presenter and all prior transferors: (1) have good title
to the instrument, U.C.C. § 3-417(1)(a); (2) have no knowledge of a forged drawer's or
maker's signature (with exceptions), id. § 3-417(1)(b); and (3) warrant that the item has not
been materially altered, id. § 3-417(1)(c). The warranties set forth in § 4-207 are almost
identical. See id. § 4-207(l)(a), 0), and (c). Note that under federal law warranties are also
made with respect to items collected through the federal reserve system. Like the Code, such
warranties are not dependent upon any express language on the item. 12 C.F.R. §§ 210.5(a)(2),
210.6(b)(i) (1989).
The warranty is breached primarily in cases of forged indorsements and material alterations.
See, e.g., Franklin Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Westbury Trust Co., 65 Misc. 2d 604, 318 N.Y.S.2d
656 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1971) (material alteration results in warranty liability under § 4-207); Bank
of the West v. Wes-Con Dev. Co., 15 Wash. App. 238, 331, 548 P.2d 563, 566 (1976) (forged
indorsement results in breach of warranty under § 4-207(1)(a)).
94. The statement in the text refers to the majority approach at common law which allowed
recovery under quasi-contract principles in cases of forged indorsements and material altera-
tions. See supra notes 54-55 and accompanying text. Like common law restitution, a warranty
action under § 3-417 or § 4-207 is available to the negligent drawee. See Steinheimer, supra
note 48, at 207-08; Note, Losses, supra note 45, at 460-62; supra note 50.
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genuineness with respect to the drawer's signature.95 As a result there is no
breach of warranty upon the presentment of an item with a forged drawer's
signature. 6 Thus, the principal exception to recovery of mistaken payments,
which under Price v. Neal was an exception to recovery under quasi-contract,
is preserved under articles 3 and 4 as an exception to the presentment
warranty provisions. The comments to sections 3-417 and 4-207 make it
clear that this result was intended by the drafters. 97
The predominance of warranty in the law governing the recovery of
mistaken payments under the Code is unmistakable. The problem is one of
ascertaining the effect of this warranty scheme on the survival of a quasi-
contract theory of recovery. Although articles 3 and 4 have expressly adopted
a warranty theory of recovering mistaken payments, they clearly have not
expressly displaced the common law action for money had and received in
a wholesale fashion. On the contrary, the comments to the Code make it
clear that with respect to the payment of an item over a stop payment
order, for example, the drafters intended to retain the common law action
for money had and received under the Code, albeit in a modified form. 98
95. The presenter warrants that he or she has good title to the item, U.C.C. §§ 3-417(1)(a),
4-207(1)(a), but courts have uniformly held that this warranty is not breached by a forged
drawer's signature. See, e.g., Bagby v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 491 F.2d
192, 199 (8th Cir. 1974); Sun 'n Sand v. United Cal. Bank, 21 Cal. 3d 671, 684-87, 582 P.2d
920, 929-32, 148 Cal. Rptr. 329, 339-40 (1978).
Under subsection (2) of both § 3-417 and § 4-207 (the so-called transfer warranties) the
transferor warrants that all signatures are genuine; however, these warranties run only to
transferees and thus will not provide a basis of recovery for the drawee/payor because it is
not a transferee under the Code. An item is not transferred to the drawee/payor bank. Instead,
it is presented for payment. Since there is no transfer, the drawee/payor is not a transferee.
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 4-207 Official Comment 4; North Carolina Nat'l Bank, 298 N.C. at 706-
07, 260 S.E.2d at 621.
96. See, e.g., Northern Trust Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 582 F. Supp. 1380, 1386
(S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 748 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1984); Fireman's Fund Ins. Co. v. Security Pac.
Nat'l Bank, 85 Cal. App. 3d 797, 807, 149 Cal. Rptr. 883, 889 n.8 (1978). On the other hand,
the presenter warrants that he or she has no knowledge of a forged drawer's signature. U.C.C.§§ 3-417(l)(b), 4-207(1)(b). As a result, presentment of an item knowing that the drawer's
signature is forged generally will result in warranty liability. See O'Malley, supra note 5, at
206 n.98. Exceptions to liability were made in certain cases when the holder was a holder in
due course who obtained acceptance without knowledge of the forgery. U.C.C. § 3-417(l)(a)(iii),
3-417 Official Comment 4.
97. "The warranties prescribed and exceptions thereto follow closely principles established
at common law, particularly, those under Price v. Neal . . . ." U.C.C. § 3-417 Official
Comment 4. "[Ihe warranties to payors are less inclusive because of exceptions reflecting the
rule of Price v. Neal ... and related principles." Id. § 4-207 Official Comment 4. These
comments suggest that the drafters were unaware of the differences between warranty and
restitution as theories of recovery. Although warranty applies to basically the same types of
mistaken payments as restitution, it, in fact, does not "follow closely" restitutionary principles.
See supra notes 81-83 and accompanying text. The adoption of a warranty theory in the
U.C.C. has not been without criticism. See, e.g., Rogers, supra note 55, at 957, 956 n.84;
Note, Doctrine, supra note 5, at 212.
98. The comments to § 4-403 state that in the event a bank pays an item over its customer's
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In addition, a few sections in articles 3 and 4 contain ambiguous language
which the courts have interpreted as impliedly incorporating, or at least
retaining, the common law action in other specific situations." However,
the implied or express retention of a restitutionary action in these situations
does not necessarily mean that it was retained in other contexts, particularly
that of recovering other types of mistaken payments by the payor bank.
Under section 1-103 the common law is retained unless it has been
displaced, and whether it has been displaced depends, under the narrow
view, on whether and to what extent it conflicts with the language of the
other Code sections. The language of the relevant article 3 Code sections
will be examined next.
1. Restitution Under Section 3-418
One of the key Code sections with respect to recovering mistaken payments
is section 3-418. The language of the section makes no express reference to
restitution or an action for money had and received. Thus, there is no
express displacement or retention of them. The section provides, in part,
that "payment or acceptance of any instrument is final in favor of a holder
in due course, or a person who has in good faith changed his position in
reliance on the payment."'0 The phrase "payment is final" could be
compatible with subsequent quasi-contract actions by the person who paid
to recover a mistaken payment, or, on the other hand, it could mean that
stop payment order, the bank "retains common-law rights, e.g., to recover money paid under
mistake (Section 1-103) ...." U.C.C. § 4-403 Official Comment 8; see, e.g., Farmers &
Merchants State Bank v. Western Bank, 841 F.2d 1433, 1438 (9th Cir. 1988). The comments
to § 4-407 similarly provide that "[t]he spelling out of the affirmative rights of the bank in
this section [in a case of paying an item over a stop payment order] does not destroy other
existing rights (Section 1-103) ... [including] rights to recover money paid under a mistake."
U.C.C. § 4-407 Official Comment 5; see also id. § 4-407 ("to prevent unjust enrichment");
Bryan, 628 S.W.2d at 761.
99. For example, § 4-212(5) provides that the failure of a bank to effect a charge-back
against its customer "does not affect other rights of the bank against the customer or any
other party." U.C.C. § 4-212(5) (emphasis added). Relying on this language, at least one court
held that charge-back is not a collecting bank's exclusive remedy against its customer, thereby
allowing an action for money had and received. Great W. Bank & Trust, 138 Ariz. at 260,
674 P.2d at 323.
In addition, § 3-419(3) provides that a bank
who has in good faith and in accordance with the reasonable commercial standards
... dealt with an instrument or its proceeds on behalf of one who was not the
true owner is not liable in conversion or otherwise to the true owner beyond the
amount of any proceeds remaining in his hands.
U.C.C. § 3-419(3) (emphasis added). Relying on this language, some courts have held that the
conversion action provided in § 3-419 did not displace the common law action for money had
and received. See, e.g., Peerless Ins. Co. v. Texas Commerce Bank, 791 F.2d 1177 (5th Cir.
1986); Citizens State Bank v. National Sur. Corp., 199 Colo. 497, 612 P.2d 70 (1980) (en
banc).
100. U.C.C. § 3-418.
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such actions are barred. A review of pre-Code case law and the relevant
commentary shows that under the dominant quasi-contract theory as well
as under the minority warranty theory, the payment is final concept meant
that subsequent recovery of the payment was barred. 10 Under this interpre-
tation, the final payment rule will displace common law restitution when
the rule applies. It thus becomes necessary to consider the circumstances
under which the final payment rule applies.
Under common law, the protection provided by this finality rule was not
available to all defendants. It was not available to defendants who were
not acting in good faith as well as to those who had not paid value for the
item. By using the holder in due course concept in section 3-418, the Code
has retained these two restrictions without significant change. 102 Moreover,
under common law, a defendant who had not paid value could nevertheless
retain the payment if he could prove that he had changed his position in
reliance on the payment, at least under the dominant quasi-contract theory.
This defense has also been retained in section 3-418.103 One significant
change with respect to the scope of protection under section 3-418 is in the
effect of the defendant's negligence on the finality of the payment. At
common law the defendant's negligence would typically preclude protection
under the rule. Under the Code, the protection of the finality rule is not
precluded by the defendant's negligence unless the negligence amounts to a
lack of good faith.104
101. Comment 8 to § 4-303 states that a party "retains common law rights to recover
money paid by mistake in cases where payment is not made final by 3-418." U.C.C. § 4-303
Official Comment 8. This language shows that the drafters saw § 3-418 as cutting off common
law restitutionary rights. This interpretation is widely held by courts. See, e.g., Morgan Guar.
Trust Co., 804 F.2d at 1494-98 (discussing New York law); Northern Trust Co., 582 F. Supp.
at 1385-86. But see Demos, 151 N.J. Super. 489, 376 A.2d 1352, 1355 (court appears to
employ a more narrow view of "payment is final," one allowing restitution under some
circumstances). It is also supported by commentators. See, e.g., R. HILLMAN, J. McDoNmNEL
& S. Nicu.ns, supra note 90, at 1.0612][c]; Lawrence, supra note 45, at 142 ("may not be
recovered by the payor, nor the acceptance avoided"); O'Malley, supra note 5, at 227-28;
Note, Allocation, supra note 5, at 1086-87 ("final-not recoverable"; "irrevocable").
102. U.C.C. § 3-418; see, e.g., Maplewood Bank & Trust Co. v. F.I.B., Inc., 142 N.J.
Super. 480, 484-85, 362 A.2d 44, 46 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1976); Bartlett v. Bank of
Carroll, 218 Va. 240, 237 S.E.2d 115 (1977). The use of the holder in due course concept in
the context of final payment has been criticized as unjustifiably restricting the protections of
final payment. 3 G. PALMEm, supra note 17, at 293, 298. For a discussion of the good faith
and payment of value requirements under the common law, see supra notes 44-55 and
accompanying text.
103. See, e.g., Mid-Continent Nat'l Bank v. Bank of Independence, 523 S.W.2d 569 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1975). Relatively few cases rest solely on the change of position defense. For an
example of a case that does, see First Nat'l City Bank v. Altman, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv.
(Callaghan) 815 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). For criticism of this decision, see, e.g., J. Wirra & R.
Stmmazs, supra note 57, at 611-14; Comment, Broader Liability, supra note 5, at 826-28. For
a discussion of the change of position concept under the common law, see supra notes 32-37
and accompanying text.
104. See U.C.C. § 3-418 Official Comment 4; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d
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If these two restrictions were the only restrictions on the finality rule, it
would represent a substantial expansion of the rule under the Code. This
is because under pre-Code law, finality of payment was limited in the first
instance to payment or acceptance of items containing forged drawer's
signatures and those drawn on insufficient funds or no account. It did not
bar recovery in cases of forged indorsements or material alterations. These
limitations on the Code's finality rule are not expressed in the language of
section 3-418; instead, they are preserved in the warranty provisions of
section 3-417 which is incorporated by reference into section 3-418 as an
exception to the operation of the rule. °s We have already seen that the
warranty provisions of section 3-417 are tailored to allow recovery of
basically the same types of mistaken payments as under the common law
quasi-contract theory, while preserving principal exceptions to recovery. By
incorporating these warranty provisions into section 3-418 as an express
exception to the finality rule, the rule is limited to essentially the same types
of mistaken payments under article 3 as it was under pre-Code law.1°6 The
official comments to section 3-418 make it clear that the drafters intended
the section to follow the rule in Price v. Neal."07 Moreover, both courts
and commentators find that the section modifies or embodies the rule.0
The finality rule in section 3-418 prohibits recovery of a mistaken pay-
ment, and this is obviously incompatible with the availability of a common
law restitutionary action. It is clear then that with respect to those mistaken
payments that are final under section 3-418, common law restitution is
at 823, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 901; Payroll Check Cashing v. New Palestine Bank, 401 N.E.2d
752, 759 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980); see also O'Malley, supra note 5, at 206; Steinheimer, supra
note 48, at 208. Note, however, that the holder in due course concept under § 3-418 includes
a requirement of good faith, U.C.C. § 3-302(l)(b), and good faith for a merchant includes
an objective standard of adherence to reasonable commercial standards. Id. § 2-103(1)(b).
Thus, a merchant's negligence will preclude protection of the finality rule under the Code as
under common law. Note, Losses, supra note 45, at 465. For a discussion of negligence under
the common law, see supra notes 29-31, 50 and accompanying text.
105. "[E]xcept for liability for breach of warranty on presentment under [§ 3-417] ......
U.C.C. § 3-418. For a discussion of the common law final payment rule, see supra notes 38-
63 and accompanying text.
106. In other words, it imposes finality on the mistaken payment in cases of forged drawer's
signature. It also imposes finality with the mistaken payment of insufficient funds and no
account items.
107. U.C.C. § 3-418 Official Comment 1.
108. See, e.g., Morgan Guar. Trust Co., 804 F.2d at 1495 (discussing New York law);
Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 822, 149 Cal. Rptr. at 900; Payroll Check
Cashing, 401 N.E.2d at 755; Mid-Continent Nat'l Bank, 523 S.W.2d at 575; First City Bank,
675 S.W.2d at 319; 3 G. PALmmR, supra note 17, at 290-91; Cooter & Rubin, A Theory of
Loss Allocation for Consumer Payments, 66 Tx. L. Rnv. 63, 105 (1987); Farnsworth, General
Survey, supra note 91, at 654-55; Lawrence, supra note 45, at 132; O'Malley, supra note 5,
at 201-06; Steinheimer, supra note 48, at 208.
The courts often ignore the real differences that exist between common law restitution and
the Code warranty provisions. As a result, they are unaware of the problems these differences
create in the Code scheme. See supra notes 81-83, 96-97 and accompanying text.
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logically inconsistent and is therefore displaced. However, the operation of
the rule is severely limited by the section 3-417 warranty exception and by
the holder in due course and good faith reliance restrictions of section 3-
418. In cases where the rule is not available, common law restitution would
not, under the narrow view, be displaced-at least not unless it is displaced
by some other Code provision.
Under this approach, common law restitution survives, but only in those
situations where payment is not final under section 3-418. This will, as a
practical matter, limit the availability of a restitutionary action to certain
types of mistaken payment cases. In cases where an item containing a forged
indorsement or material alteration is paid, recovery of the payment is clearly
available under the section 3-417 statutory presentment warranty as an
express exception to the final payment rule.'09 Availability of a warranty
action would render the restitutionary claim superfluous in most cases, but
restitution is not logically inconsistent with the warranty claim. Under the
narrow view, therefore, the restitutionary claim would not be displaced. 110
Instead, the two theories of recovery exist as alternative claims in these
types of mistaken payment cases. By comparison, no presentment warranty
is typically breached in a case involving a forged drawer's signature, or an
item drawn on insufficient funds or a closed account,"' but the final
payment rule under section 3-418 will displace a restitutionary action if the
recipient of the payment is a holder in due course of the item or changed
his position in good faith reliance on the payment. It is only when we have
payment of an item containing a forged drawer's signature or of an item
109. 3 G. PALM&ER, supra note 17, at 295; O'Maley, supra note 5, at 229-30, 262; Steinheimer,
supra note 48, at 207; Note, Losses, supra note 45, at 457; Note, Allocation, supra note 5,
at 1081, 1087; Comment, Broader Liability, supra note 5, at 821.
110. Professor Palmer takes the view that a warranty action "should not exclude the use
of quasi contract." 3 G. PALMER, supra note 17, at 283. He suggests circumstances where
restitution may be preferable to warranty. Id. at 283-84, 307-08, 310.
111. With respect to insufficient funds items, see, e.g., Lowe's of Sanford, Inc. v. Mid-
South Bank & Trust Co., 44 N.C. App. 365, 260 S.E.2d 801 (1979). With respect to forged
signatures, see, e.g., Payroll Check Cashing, 401 N.E.2d at 757; see also O'Malley, supra note
5, at 193 n.30; Steinheimer, supra note 48, at 208-09; supra notes 92-96 and accompanying
text.
Note that in cases where the recipient knew the item would not be paid or that he had no
right to payment, courts have granted restitution from a holder in due course although no
warranty was breached. This knowledge shifts the equities in favor of the drawee. See Morgan
Guar. Trust Co., 804 F.2d at 1495-97 (discussing New York law); see also Bank Leumi Trust
Co. v.Bally's Park Place, Inc., 528 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
With respect to closed account items, see O'Malley, supra note 5, at 193 n.30. The most
common types of check fraud are insufficient funds and no account checks. Id. at 191 n.21,
193. According to Professor Farnsworth, no account and insufficient fund items are "almost
invariably detected by the drawee and dishonored." Farnsworth, Insurance, supra note 45, at
297; see also Rogers, supra note 55, at 948 & n.64 (most common reason for a returned check
is for insufficient funds). As a result, the instances where the final payment rule would protect
prior parties are limited, and the loss from such items typically falls on merchants and others
who take checks.
1990]
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
drawn on insufficent funds or a closed account where the recipient is not
a holder in due course or did not rely on the payment that a restitutionary
action would be available as a sole cause of action. This is not, however,
to suggest that such an action, if brought against the recipient of the
payment, would be successful for the plaintiff. Recall that at common law,
restitution was generally not available in cases where an insufficient funds
item or no account item was paid by mistake.' 2
The analysis of section 3-418 up to this point has focused on the degree
to which it has displaced the common law action for money had and
received. This focus is logical given that the starting point of the Code
analysis was section 1-103. There is, however, another perspective on section
3-418 that should be considered. While most courts see the function of
section 3-418 as imposing limits on recovering payments under restitution
and not as a source of a right to recover a payment,"' there is authority
for the view that section 3-418 embodies or creates a right to recover
payments as well as sets forth restrictions on that right." 4
112. See supra notes 51-53, 81 and accompanying text. Compare Central Bank & Trust Co.
v. General Fin. Corp., 297 F.2d 126 (5th Cir. 1961) (restitution denied in case of mistaken
payment of insufficient fund item) with Manufacturers Trust Co. v. Diamond, 17 Misc. 2d
909, 186 N.Y.S.2d 917 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1959) (restitution allowed with no account check unless
change of position); see also Town & Country State Bank v. First State Bank, 358 N.W.2d
387 (Minn. 1984) (court suggests that even if the payor could show that the defendant was
not a holder in due course, it would still have to establish a right to restitution, e.g., based
on fraud or mistake, and may not be able to do so); Demos, 151 N.J. Super. at 496, 500,
376 A.2d at 1355, 1357-58 (court characterizes this as a "waiver" of restitutionary rights).
113. See, e.g., Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 841 F.2d at 1438; Perini Corp., 553 F.2d
at 416-17; Northern Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. at 1385-86; Town & Country State Bank, 358
N.W.2d at 394-95. For commentary supporting this view, see, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 45,
at 142-43 (under both the Code and the N.I.L. payor's right to recover must rest on common
law restitution); O'Malley, supra note 5, at 201, 227-28; Comment, Broader Liability, supra
note 5, at 834 n.129.
114. This view is typically based on two arguments. First, the official comment to § 3-418
states that the section is intended to follow "the rule of Price v. Neal." U.C.C. § 3-418
Official Comment 1. That case was a restitution case and, therefore, by codifying the "rule"
of the case, the section creates a right of restitution or recovery. The problem with this
argument is that the language found in that comment is ambiguous. The rule of Price v. Neal
is one of precluding recovery, or put another way, one of making payment final in certain
circumstances. It is questionable to argue that codifying a rule making certain payments final
entails a rule allowing recovery of payments. Moreover, the result of Price v. Neal, which was
nonrecovery of a mistaken payment, is compatible with a warranty theory of recovery as was
seen under the minority approach at common law and under the N.I.L. After all, the official
comments to § 3-417 contain a nearly identical statement that the section-entailing a system
of warranty recovery-follows the rule in Price v. Neal. Id. § 3-417 Official Comment 4.
Second, the view that § 3-418 creates a right to recover some mistaken payments is also
supported by a negative inference drawn from the language of the section. The section provides
that "payment is final" in certain circumstances. This implies that payment is not final, i.e.
can be recovered, in those circumstances not covered by the rule. This argument is plausible
when § 3-418 is looked at in isolation; however, to suggest that a restitutionary right is implied
in the language of the section clearly overlooks the express mandate of § 1-103 that the
common law of mistake is to supplement the provisions of the Code. Moreover, the inference
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The significance of the distinction between these two views of the function
of section 3-418, one of creating a limited right to recover mistaken payments
and the other of selectively displacing common law restitution, is made
apparent when one asks whether a payor bank can obtain restitution of a
payment under the Code under circumstances where restitution would be
denied at common law. This is the key issue in any case where a bank
mistakenly pays an insufficient fund or no account item and the recipient
of the money is not a holder in due course and did not change his position
in reliance on the payment. If we consider section 3-418 as the source of
restitutionary rights, then restitution should be available. Even though
typically no warranty is breached with insufficient fund or no account items,
payment is not final under section 3-418 and a right of recovery is inferred.
If, on the other hand, we consider section 3-418 as merely selectively
displacing common law restitution, then restitution will generally not be
available because it was generally not available at common law. The results,
however, under this latter approach will differ depending on what state law
is applied in the case because the common law rule was not uniform. '
The analysis up to this point has proceeded from the narrow view of
displacement under section 1-103, focusing on the extent to which article 3
displaces common law restitution. Displacement here depends on whether a
restitutionary action would be inconsistent with the language of the article
3 sections. The next step is to consider those Code sections dealing with
"recovery of bank payments," the other express exception to the final
payment rule under section 3-418. The next section of this Article will
consider the provisions of article 4 related to the recovery of bank payments
and analyze their impact on common law restitution.
under § 3-418 that payments can be recovered under certain circumstances is at least equally
compatible with a warranty theory which is the predominant theory of recovering payments
in both article 3 and article 4. For an example of a court that views § 3-418 as both embodying
a right to recover payments and setting forth restrictions on that right, see Blake v. Woodford
Bank & Trust, 555 S.W.2d 589, 601-02 (Ky. Ct. App. 1977).
115. For an example of a court's reliance on common law restitution under state law, see
National Say. & Trust Co. v. Park Corp., 722 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 466
U.S. 939 (1984); see also Comment, Broader Liability, supra note 5; cf. Demos, 151 N.J.
Super. at 500-01, 376 A.2d at 1357-58.
In saying that common law restitution was generally not available in insufficient funds and
closed account cases one must distinguish between two possible reasons for that result. One
could be a simple extension of Price v. Neal with its supporting rationale, but, if so, the
restrictions on Price v. Neal would go along as well, namely, requiring good faith payment
of value or good faith change of position. On the other hand, the result of non-recovery
could be based on the theory that in insufficient funds cases and no account cases there is no
mistake sufficient to justify restitution. This makes the issues of good faith, value, and change
of position irrelevant. As a result, the consideration of common law restitution needs to
account for this distinction, especially if we consider § 3-418 as a source of recovery rather
than merely restricting common law restitution.
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2. Restitution Under Article 4 Sections
In examining article 4 to determine if common law restitution has been
displaced by the U.C.C., two sections deserve particular attention: section
4-213 and section 4-302. Subsection (1) of section 4-213 describes the ways
in which final payment may occur. The two most significant ways specified
are payment of the item either in cash or by posting, and failure to revoke
the provisional credits before the midnight deadline. Subsection (1) further
provides that when final payment occurs through posting or by failure to
revoke provisional credits, the payor bank shall be accountable for the
amount of the item.'1 6 Section 4-302 also specifies bank accountability.117 It
provides, in part, that except for where there is a breach of a presentment
warranty, "or the like," the payor bank is "accountable" for the amount
of any item it retains beyond the midnight deadline without paying the item
or dishonoring it."' Accountability is broader in scope under section 4-302
than under section 4-213 because section 4-302 provides that the payor bank
which retains the item is accountable regardless of whether or not the item
is properly payable.119
Neither section defines the meaning of the term "accountable." According
to comment 7 to section 4-213, accountability imposes upon the payor "a
duty to account, which duty is met if and when a settlement for the item
satisfactorily clears.' ' 120 This definition does not adequately describe the
exact nature of this duty to account. In spite of this ambiguity under the
Code, there has been a high degree of uniformity in the courts' interpretation
of this term. Beginning with the Rock Island Auction Sales, Inc. v. Empire
Packing Co.12 1 case in 1965, courts have interpreted the term "accountable"
as synonymous with liable and have held the payor to a strict standard of
116. U.C.C. § 4-213(1).
117. The redundant treatment of this subject is curious. No differences can be discerned
between the two sections. Professor Leary asserts that the clause should not have been included
in § 4-213 since it provides a penalty for nonaction and should have more appropriately been
included in §§ 4-301 and 4-302. Leary, A Proposal for the Automation of Returns of Cash
Items, 19 U.C.C. L.J. 47, 52 (1986).
118. U.C.C. § 4-302 (emphasis added). Section 4-302 specifies payor bank accountability
where the bank has failed to act within specified time limits. This failure is sometimes referred
to as "undue retention" or "delayed return." For a historical treatment of the undue retention
doctrine, see Blake, 555 S.W.2d at 589. See generally Note, Retention of a Check: Payor
Bank's Liability Under Section 4-302, 10 B.C. INDus. & Com. L. Rnv. 116 (1968) [hereinafter
Note, Retention of a Check].
119. U.C.C. § 4-302(a). The payor bank is, in addition, liable for the face amount of the
item rather than for the amount of any actual damages which resulted from the payor bank's
inaction. Rock Island Auction Sales, Inc. v. Empire Packing Co., 32 IIl. 2d 269, 204 N.E.2d
721 (1965); Note, Retention of a Check, supra note 118, at 117. For cases equating the term
accountable with liable, see infra note 122 and accompanying text.
120. U.C.C. § 4-213 Official Comment 7.
121. 32 Ill. 2d at 269, 204 N.E.2d at 721.
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liability for retaining the item past the midnight deadline.' 22 The practical
effect of accountability is, however, unclear. Inasmuch as the "accountable"
language under both sections applies only to noncash final payments, it has
been suggested that the term merely imposes an affirmative duty on the
payor bank to disburse money for the item.'23 Comment 7 to section 4-213
suggests that accountability is designed, at least in part, to put noncash
final payment, such as that which occurs through undue retention, on a
par with cash final payment. This is consistent with the interpretation of
accountability as merely requiring disbursement. This interpretation does
not, however, address the question of the payor's common law right to
restitution following mistaken payment.' 24
122. For cases equating the term accountable with liable, see, e.g., Houston Contracting
Co. v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 539 F. Supp. 247 (S.D.N.Y. 1982); Universal C.I.T. Credit
Corp. v. Farmers Bank, 358 F. Supp. 317 (E.D. Mo. 1973); Farmers Coop. Livestock Mkt.,
Inc. v. Second Nat'l Bank, 427 S.W.2d 247 (Ky. 1968); Sun River Cattle Co. v. Miners Bank,
164 Mont. 237, 521 P.2d 679 (1974); Berman v. United States Nat'l Bank, 197 Neb. 268, 249
N.W.2d 187 (1976). Often courts fail to define the term accountable, holding only that the
payor is accountable for the face amount of the item. Such courts, by implication, interpret
the term accountable as meaning liable. See, e.g., Ashford Bank v. Capital Preservation Fund,
Inc., 544 F. Supp. 26 (D. Mont. 1982); Bank of Wyandotte v. Woodrow, 394 F. Supp. 550
(W.D. Mo. 1975); Capital City First Nat'l Bank v. Lewis State Bank, 341 So. 2d 1025 (Fla.
Dist. Ct. App. 1977); Reynolds-Wilson Lumber Co. v. Peoples Nat'l Bank, 699 P.2d 146
(Okla. 1985). It should be noted that in the cases cited above, the holding pertains to the
accountable language found in § 4-302. No reported case was found interpreting the term
accountable in § 4-213. This could be explained if the role § 4-213 plays in the statutory
scheme is to describe when final payment occurs rather than to explain its consequences. See
infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text.
123. Note, Commercial Code-Articles 3 and 4-Bank Required to Disburse Funds After
Final Payment, 64 MARQ. L. REv. 408, 411 (1980).
124. It is unclear whether the strict liability imposed works only to deny defenses in a suit
against the payor bank to account for the amount of the item, or whether it would also deny
relief by the bank in a suit to recover the funds once disbursed. In by far the majority of
cases equating the term accountable with liable, this question arose in a suit to account against
the payor bank. See, e.g., Catalina Yachts v. Old Colony Bank & Trust Co., 497 F. Supp.
1227 (D. Mass. 1980); National City Bank v. Motor Contract Co., 119 Ga. App. 208, 166
S.E.2d 742 (1969); Available Iron & Metal Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 Ill. App. 3d 516, 371
N.E.2d 1032 (1977); Templeton v. First Nat'l Bank, 47 Ill. App. 3d 443, 362 N.E.2d 33 (1977);
Kane v. American Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 21 Ill. App. 3d 1046, 316 N.E.2d 177 (1974). The
issue of restitution was not discussed in the above cases. This could be true, of course, for a
variety of reasons. It might not have been raised by the payor bank; circumstances might not
have existed justifying restitution; it could have been raised but rejected by the court without
discussion. Alternatively, this might be seen as support for the argument that § 4-302 imposes
a strict duty to disburse funds regardless of the equities involved. See infra notes 128-40 and
accompanying text where this argument is advanced in more detail.
Similarly, most cases in which restitution was discussed arose where funds had already been
disbursed. See, e.g., Peerless Ins. Co., 791 F.2d at 1177; Ashford Bank, 544 F. Supp. at 26;
Bank Leumi Trust Co., 528 F. Supp. at 349; Maplewood Bank & Trust Co., 142 N.J. Super.
at 480, 362 A.2d at 44; First Nat'l City Bank, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. at 815. In these cases the
payor bank was suing to recover the money paid by mistake, with court attention focusing
upon § 3-418. This could support the view that article 4 requires disbursement of funds, while
article 3 determines restitutionary rights. See infra notes 143-46 and accompanying text where
this view is discussed.
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The relationship between final payment in article 3 and accountability in
article 4 is unclear. If the accountable language found in article 4 merely
requires the payor bank to disburse funds, to, in effect, put itself in the
same position as if it had paid the item in cash, no restrictions on common
law restitutionary rights would be created. The payor bank under article 4
would possess whatever restitutionary rights a drawee bank had under article
3. Recall that section 3-418 provides for final payment, but with the
significant restrictions of holder in due course and good faith reliance. If,
on the other hand, the accountable language operates to prohibit restitution
once final payment under section 4-213 has occurred, it would appear to
entail an absolute prohibition on restitution because the restrictions found
in section 3-418 are not found in either section 4-213 or section 4-302. In
other words, neither section 4-213 nor section 4-302 specifies that the payor
is accountable only to a holder in due course or to a party who changed
his position in reliance on the payment. 2 5 Each, thus, appears to provide
for final payment, but with virtually no restrictions. If the accountable
language in section 4-213 and section 4-302 establishes a final payment rule,
it is in marked contrast with that of section 3-418.126
The problem can be illustrated by examining it in the context of a
situation where the payor bank pays an instrument containing a forged
drawer's signature. 127 The key issue in such an instance is the availability
of restitution. It is here that the apparent conflict between the language of
section 3-418 and the article 4 sections comes into focus. Under section 3-
125. In addition, it does not except the breach of warranty situation. Whether this was
based on drafter oversight or was intentional is unclear. Commentators seem in agreement
that breach of warranty offers relief to the payor bank even if final payment has occurred
under § 4-213. See e.g., Griffith, Final Payment and Warranties on Presentment Under the
Commercial Code-Some Aspects, 23 DRAKE L. REV. 34, 35, 37 (1973); Note, Allocation,
supra note 5, at 1089 n.78.
126. The conflict between §§ 4-213 and 3-418 has been recognized previously. See, e.g., B.
CLARK, T FE LAW OF BANK DEPOSITS, COLLECTIONS AND CREDIT CARDS § 3.613], at 3-38 to 3-
40 (rev. ed. 1981); J. Wm & R. Srtummnas, supra note 57, § 16-2, at 613-17; Edwards,
Recovery of Final Payments Under the Commercial Code, 6 Omo N.U.L. REv. 341 (1979);
Finan, Check Payment: Finality Under the Commercial Code, 2 AxRON L. REv. 26 (1968);
Hill, A Drawee's Right to Restitution of Mistaken Payments Under Articles 3 and 4 of the
U.C.C.: A Plea for Clarification, 7 J. L. & CoM. 293 (1987); Note, Easy Come, Easy Go;
U. C. C. Section 3-418 and the Restitutionary Rights of Banks: National Savings and Trust Co.
v. Park Corp., 2 DET. C.L. Rav. 681 (1985) [hereinafter Note, Easy Come, Easy Go]; Note,
Check Kiting: The Inadequacy of the Commercial Code, 1986 DuE L.J. 728, 733-37; Note,
Mistaken Payment and Restitutionary Principles Under the Commercial Code, 56 U. CIN. L.
REv. 1075 (1988) [hereinafter Note, Mistaken Payment]; Note, Allocation, supra note 5, at
1088-90.
127. Recall that the question of restitution arises most frequently in the forged drawer's
signature or insufficient funds situation. Where the payor has paid over a forged indorsement,
a breach of warranty claim would more easily enable the payor to recover the payment. See
supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text. In a forged drawer's signature case, the payor bank
is typically unable to assert a breach of warranty claim. See supra notes 95-97, 107-08 and
accompanying text.
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418, payment of an item with a forged drawer's signature is final in favor
of a holder in due course or someone who relied in good faith on the
payment. As a result, the payor's or drawee's restitutionary rights are
limited to cases where there is no holder in due course or good faith
reliance. The conflict arises when one attempts to apply the accountable
language from article 4. The language of sections 4-213 and 4-302 purport
to make the payor accountable and do not limit accountability to cases
where there is a holder in due course or good faith reliance. The problem
arises when the party making presentment of an item on which the drawer's
signature was forged is not a holder in due course and cannot show good
faith reliance. Restitution might be available to the drawee under article 3,
but restitution would be barred under article 4 unless the holder in due
course and good faith reliance restrictions from section 3-418 are read into
article 4.
There are three alternative interpretations which have been offered to
resolve the apparent conflict between Code sections. It is useful to examine
and evaluate each proposed construction.
a. Article 4 Prevails
Advocates of the first approach assert that the language, "except for
recovery of bank payments" found in section 3-418, recognizes that article
4 provides different rules with respect to final payment. Further, in the case
of a conflict between articles, article 4 prevails when the case involves check
collection. 12 Under this approach, once a check has entered the check
collection system, all restitutionary rights would be cut off. Finality of
payment would not be limited to a holder in due course or good faith
reliance because these section 3-418 limitations would not be read into article
4. The only restriction that would be incorporated into the operation of
article 4 would be a requirement of good faith on the part of the presenting
party and prior transferors. 29
This view has support from courts and commentators. 30 In addition, the
drafting history of the Code, including an examination of prior statutes and
128. U.C.C. § 4-102.
129. Although there is no provision excepting bad faith presenters from the protections of
article 4, there is near unanimous agreement that payment made to one acting in bad faith is
not final. Id. § 3-418 comment 3; see, e.g., Perini Corp., 553 F.2d at 398; Bartlett, 218 Va.
at 247, 237 S.E.2d at 115; First Wyoming Bank v. Cabinet Craft Distribs., Inc., 624 P.2d 227
(Wyo. 1981).
130. See, e.g., Ashford Bank, 544 F. Supp. at 26; Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l Bank,
210 Va. 88, 168 S.E.2d 273 (1969); B. CL.pm, supra note 126, § 6.2[l], at 6-7; J. WmrE &
R. SurmmEs, supra note 57, § 16-2, at 617-18. There is, however, evidence that in the next
edition of the White and Summers treatise the authors will change their position on this issue.
See D. EPsTmN & J. MArlN, BAsic CoMMRCUI CODE 514 (2d ed. 1983). Here is found the
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commentary at the time of enactment, supports this position. While admit-
ting that "no good reason is apparent for the fundamental differences"
between section 3-418 on the one hand and section 4-213 on the other,
Professors White and Summers cite the New York Law Revision Commission
Report as support for their view that:
It appears ... that the very difference with which we are concerned
was pointed out to the draftsmen in 1954. They answered that the
difference was intended and that those who could not claim the protec-
tion of 3-418, because they had not changed their position in reliance
or because they were not holders in due course, might nevertheless claim
the protection of 4-302 and 4-213."'
The rationale for this distinction can, to some extent, be uncovered by an
examination of pre-Code statute and practice. Prior to World War II, payor
banks customarily processed items, as they were received, before two or
three o'clock in the afternoon of the day of presentment.12 Wartime
personnel shortages led to the practice of deferred posting. 3 3 This practice,
however, imposed risks upon the payor bank. Under the provisions of the
N.I.L., the drawee bank had only twenty-four hours within which to decide
whether or not to honor a check. 3 4 If the drawee failed to return a check
within the time period specified, it was deemed to have accepted the item.135
Despite this potential liability, the practice of deferred posting became
increasingly popular. Several pre-Code statutes authorizing deferred posting
reprint of a letter written by James White in which he admits that his view on the § 3-418
and § 4-213 conflict was wrong. See infra note 140 for a partial quote of this letter. A change
in this influential treatise might have a significant impact on court treatment. See Park, 722
F.2d at 1303 (discussion of the change contemplated in White and Summers' view); see also
Note, Mistaken Payment, supra note 126.
131. J. WrmT & R. Su'mmns, supra note 57, § 16-2, at 615-16 n.22 (citing 2 N.Y. State
Law Revision Comm'n, 1955 Report 1075 (1955)); see also id. § 16-2, at 614 & n.17 (citing
U.C.C., 1953 Official Draft of Text and Comments 142-43 (Supp. No. 1, 1955)).
132. Leary, Deferred Posting and Delayed Returns- The Current Check Collection Problem,
62 HARv. L. REv. 905, 915-16 (1949) [hereinafter Leary, Deferred Posting]. This practice is
referred to as dribble posting. Id. at 916.
133. Deferred posting refers to the practice of sorting and proving items on the day that
they are received but not posting the item until the day following the day of presentment.
U.C.C. § 4-301 Official Comment 1. For a discussion of this process, see Leary, Deferred
Posting, supra note 132, at 917.
134. N.I.L. § 136; see also Leary, Deferred Posting, supra note 132, at 918; Note, Retention
of a Check, supra note 118, at 119.
135. Central Bank & Trust Co., 297 F.2d at 126 (liability for delayed retention); College
Station State Bank v. Fulcher, 296 S.W.2d 953 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956); Note, Retention of a
Check, supra note 118, at 119-20. Moreover, the majority rule was that mere retention
constituted implied refusal to return the item for which the drawee would be liable as an
acceptor. Leary, Deferred Posting, supra note 132, at 918-19; Note, Retention of a Check,
supra note 118, at 120; see, e.g., State Bank v. Weiss, 46 Misc. 93, 91 N.Y.S. 276 (1904);
Wisner v. First Nat'l Bank, 220 Pa. 21, 68 A. 955 (1908). The rule was later abrogated by
statute in Pennsylvania. Leary, Deferred Posting, supra note 132, at 918. Contra Womack v.
Durrett, 24 S.W.2d 463 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930) (§ 137 only applicable where the item was
presented for acceptance not payment).
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were promulgated to diminish the risks to payor banks of deferred posting;
none was widely enacted.' 36 The Code provided a compromise solution. In
exchange for codification of deferred posting practices, the Code provided
a penalty' 7 for delay, namely, accountability. A primary goal of article 4,
to insure speedy bulk processing of items, 3 was furthered by the account-
ability requirement. 139 Accountability under this interpretation would entail
strict liability with no restitution possible.14
In spite of its initial attractiveness, this alternative has several flaws. First,
it would elevate section 4-213 (and section 4-302) over section 3-418 in
importance since most disputes over forgeries and insufficient funds checks
arise within the check collection system. Section 3-418 would be relegated
to cases involving promissory notes and drafts collected outside the bank
collection system. Court decisions have certainly not supported this inter-
pretation. In fact, in the instance of forged drawer's signatures, for example,
courts have typically ignored the conflict between section 3-418 and article
136. The Bank Collection Code, supported by the American Bankers Association, was one
of the most widely adopted, with passage in 19 states. Leary, Deferred Posting, supra note
132, at 919 n.23; Leary & Schmitt, Some Bad News and Some Good News from Articles
Three and Four, 43 OEo ST. L.J. 611, 617 (1982). In 1948 the American Bankers Association
drafted the Model Deferred Posting Statute as an amendment to the Bank Collection Code.
The Model Deferred Posting Statute, a forerunner to U.C.C. § 4-302, gave payor banks until
midnight of the banking day following presentment of the item within which to act. This was
adopted in few states. Id. at 121-22. For a discussion of various pre-Code legislative solutions,
see generally Leary, Deferred Posting, supra note 132, at 926-28.
137. Leary & Schmitt, supra note 136, at 623; see also Leary, Deferred Posting, supra note
132, at 929 (describing accountability as the "sanction compelling decision"). Professor Leary
states that contrary to the theory of pre-Code statutes, "the theory of the Code is that payment
by the payor bank has been made, but can be recovered." Id. at 930; see also supra notes
155-66 and accompanying text. The compromise was accepted by the bankers and the Federal
Reserve. For a description of the compromise, see Leary & Schmitt, supra note 136, at 623;
Leary & Tarlow, Reflections on Articles 3 and 4 for a Review Committee, 48 TEmp. L.Q.
919, 941 n.46 (1975).
138. Starcraft Co. v. C.J. Heck Co., 748 F.2d 982, 986 (5th Cir. 1984); Chrysler Credit
Corp. v. First Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 582 F. Supp. 1436, 1438 (W.D. Pa.), aff'd, 746 F.2d
200 (3d Cir. 1984).
139. To the extent that finality is an underlying policy consideration in article 4, it has been
argued that accountability requires strict liability. Starcraft Co., 748 F.2d at 986; Town &
Country State Bank, 358 N.W.2d at 395; B. CLARK, supra note 126, § 3.613], at 3-40; J.
WE & R. StmoRRs, supra note 57, § 1, at 3; Note, Mistaken Payment, supra note 126, at
1094.
140. See e.g., B. CLARK, supra note 126, § 6.2[l], at 6-7; J. Wr & R. SuMNMRs, supra
note 57, § 16.2, at 613-18. Professor White explains:
[M]y sources among the drafters of Article 4 tell me that the "accountable"
language in 4-302 was intended to cut off any restitutionary claim that a tardy
bank might have. He tells me that section 4-302 is the banker's concession made
in return for the right to hold a check for a day and a half before final payment
has occurred (in contrast to pre-Code shorter deadlines.) It was understood that
if a banker held a check (without "paying" or "returning" it) beyond the
midnight deadline, that check could not be sent back even if it was NSF and
even if the party receiving it did not qualify under 3-418.
D. EPsTIN & J. MARTiN, supra note 130, at 514.
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4 and have applied section 3-418 even where the check is clearly in the
check collection system.' 4'
Second, while this alternative can be justified by reference to pre-Code
law and by viewing the Code as a compromise (imposing strict liability
under article 4 in exchange for a longer period of time within which to
post items), imposition of strict liability is not justified in cases where the
bank paid the item by actually disbursing the funds. Recall that where final
payment has been effected by paying cash for the item, the payor bank is
not accountable for the item under the language of sections 4-213 and 4-
302. Whether or not restitution would be available in such a situation is
not considered under this approach. Similarly, where final payment has
occurred by posting the item, the payor bank is also accountable; however,
strict liability, which is imposed to penalize the dilatory bank in cases of
undue retention, is uncalled for in that instance.
Third, article 4 is itself inconsistent in its approach. For example, while
section 4-213 makes no exception to accountability even for breach of
warranty, section 4-302 expressly excepts breach of warranty. This alternative
does not accommodate these differences.
Last, neither section 4-213 nor section 4-302 limits applicability of the
accountability provisions by a requirement of good faith on the part of the
presenting party or prior transferor. Although article 4 nowhere specifies
lack of good faith as a defense to accountability, there is nearly uniform
consensus that where the payee receives payment in bad faith, the payor
bank should be permitted to recover its payment.42
b. Section 4-213 Specifies Only the Time and
Not the Effect of Final Payment
The second alternative for resolving the apparent conflict between the
Code sections is to offer an alternative construction of section 4-213. Under
this interpretation, section 4-213 is viewed as establishing rules for deter-
mining when final payment occurs, rather than governing the legal conse-
quences of final payment. 43 The legal consequences of final payment would
141. See, e.g., Perini Corp., 553 F.2d at 398; Payroll Check Cashing, 401 N.E.2d at 752;
Mortimer Agency, Inc. v. Underwriters Trust Co., 73 Misc. 2d 970, 341 N.Y.S.2d 75 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1973); Valley Bank v. Bank of Commerce, 74 Misc. 2d 195, 343 N.Y.S.2d 191 (N.Y.
Civ. Ct. 1973); Richardson Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 504 S.W.2d 812 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974);
Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Hampton State Bank, 497 S.W.2d 80 (Tex. Ct. App. 1973); see
also Note, Allocation, supra note 5, at 1089.
142. See supra note 129 and accompanying text; see, e.g., J. Wrra & R. Suitrs, supra
note 57, § 16-2, at 613-18.
143. Under this construction, § 4-213 is thought to refer primarily to the timing of final
payment. Note, Allocation, supra note 5, at 1088 n.75. The use of the term "final" in U.C.C.
§ 4-213 is thought only to distinguish final from provisional payments. Final payment under
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be governed by section 3-418 and the common law as applied through
section 1-103. Under this construction, the accountability language of section
4-213 would put noncash payments on a par with cash payment by requiring
that the payor disburse money for all items on which noncash final payment
was made. It would, however, have no effect on the payor's right to
restitution when such final payment was made by mistake. Payment of a
check would be final, even under article 4, only in favor of a holder in
due course or other party who in good faith relied on the payment.
This interpretation is supported in part by reference to some Code official
comments. Comment 5 to section 3-418 refers to final payment "as defined
in section 4-213."'14 Comment 3 to section 4-213 describes the section as
"fixing the point of time" at which final payment occurs. 45 Support for
this alternative can also be found in both court opinion and commentary.
46
Unlike the first alternative, which renders section 3-418 applicable only
where the item has not entered the check collection process, the second
alternative gives effect to both section 3-418 and section 4-213.
There are, on the other hand, major problems with this alternative
interpretation that cannot be ignored. It is based upon a construction of
the purposes of sections 3-418 and 4-213; however, it ignores entirely section
4-302. 47 The language and operation of sections 3-418 and 4-213 must be
compared with that of section 4-302, as interpreted by the courts. Recall
that section 4-302 provides that the payor bank is accountable for the
amount of any item it retains beyond the midnight deadline without paying
the item or dishonoring it. The term accountable here has been widely
interpreted to impose strict liability upon the payor bank. The only defenses
recognized to this strict liability under section 4-302 are breach of warranty
and lack of good faith. While the time limits under section 4-302 may be
extended under the operation of section 4-108, that excuse section has been
construed very narrowly. 4 The key question in construction of section 4-
§ 3-418, on the other hand, "deprives a drawee who has finally paid off a cause of action
for the recovery of payment except as provided by the Code for breach of presentment
warranty." Finan, supra note 126, at 28. The author continues:
If payment is final under both sections, no recovery may be had by a bank
except as specifically provided by the Code. If payment is final only under § 4-
213(1) however, resort may be had not only to the breach of warranty provisions
of the Code, but also to supplementary principles of law and equity.
Id. at 28-29 (footnote omitted); see also Griffith, supra note 125, at 34.
144. U.C.C. § 3-418 Official Comment 5 (1977) (emphasis added).
145. Id. § 4-213 Official Comment 3.
146. See, e.g., Park, 722 F.2d at 1303; Blake, 555 S.W.2d at 589; R. BRAUCHER & R.
RiEGERT, supra note 8, at 128-29; Comment, Broader Liability, supra note 5, at 828-37.
147. Most commentators who have considered this conflict have, likewise, ignored § 4-302.
See, e.g., Hill, supra note 126; Note, Easy Come, Easy Go, supra note 126; Comment,
Broader Liability, supra note 5.
148. See, e.g., Bank Leumi Trust Co., 499 F. Supp. at 1022 (error in encoding computer
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302 is whether a payor bank who by mistake retained an item beyond the
midnight deadline is entitled to restitution. Courts attaching strict liability
to the payor under section 4-302 have not limited this liability to cases
where the presenting party or prior transferor was a holder in due course
or showed good faith reliance. 49 In fact, few undue retention cases even
mention a restitution claim.' 50 Even in those cases in which restitution is
.discussed, nearly all courts refuse to allow it.Y5'
If section 4-302 provides an absolute rule of liability subject only to the
limited number of defenses discussed, this creates a conflict with both
section 4-213 and section 3-418. In addition to accountability under section
4-302, the payor bank is accountable under section 4-213 when final payment
has occurred through any of the noncash methods. If these terms are
construed consistently so that the strict liability rule of section 4-302 is
applied in section 4-213, the result is a major conflict between section 4-
does not constitute excuse); Blake, 555 S.W.2d at 589 (holiday personnel absences with
malfunctioning machines do not constitute excuse); Sun River Cattle Co., 164 Mont. at 237,
521 P.2d at 679 (armored car breakdown with computer malfunction does not constitute
excuse); see also Comment, When the Clock Strikes Twelve, Is it Really Midnight?: U.C.C.
Section 4-302 and the Midnight Deadline, 1983 ANN. Rat. oF BANKING 191, 198.
149. Most courts impose strict liability under the accountability requirement without regard
to whether or not the party receiving payment is a member of either protected category. See,
e.g., Peoples Bank v. Bob Lincoln, Inc., 283 So. 2d 400 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1973); National
City Bank, 119 Ga. App. at 208, 166 S.E.2d at 742; Sun River Cattle Co., 164 Mont. at 237,
521 P.2d at 679; Sunshine v. Bankers Trust Co., 42 A.D.2d 544, 345 N.Y.S.2d 19 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1973), rev'd, 34 N.Y.2d 404, 314 N.E.2d 860, 358 N.Y.S.2d 113 (1974); Fromer Distribs.,
Inc. v. Bankers Trust Co., 36 A.D.2d 840, 321 N.Y.S.2d 428 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). However,
a careful reading of undue retention cases reveals that in a number of cases the facts indicate
that the presenting party might have been a holder in due course. See, e.g., Homey v.
Covington County Bank, 716 F.2d 335 (5th Cir. 1983); Gates v. Manufacturers Hanover Trust
Co., 98 A.D.2d 829, 470 N.Y.S.2d 492 (N.Y. App. Div. 1983); Reynolds-Wilson Lumber Co.,
699 P.2d at 146; Suttle Motor Corp. v. Citizens Bank, 216 Va. 568, 221 S.E.2d 784 (1976).
150. It is, of course, unclear whether this is because the parties never raised the issue of
restitution or whether the court ignored the arguments. For a limited number of undue
retention cases in which the court addressed the issue of restitution, see, e.g., Toronto-
Dominion Bank v. Central Nat'l Bank & Trust, 753 F.2d 66 (8th Cir. 1985); Morgan Guar.
Trust Co., 605 F. Supp. at 1086; Bank of Wyandotte v. Woodrow, 394 F. Supp. 550 (W.D.
Mo. 1975); Bartlett v. Bank of Carroll, 218 Va. 240, 237 S.E.2d 115 (1977); Northwestern
Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Midland Nat'l Bank, 96 Wis. 2d 155, 292 N.W.2d 591 (1980).
151. For undue retention cases in which the court refused to recognize the payor bank's
right to restitution, see e.g., State & Say. Bank v. Meeker, 469 N.E.2d 55 (Ind. Ct. App.
1984); Town & Country State Bank, 358 N.W.2d at 387; Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 96
Wis. 2d at 155, 292 N.W.2d at 591 (restitution denied absent a showing of bad faith). For
undue retention cases in which the court denied restitution but appeared to recognize the
availability of such relief to payor banks, at least under the limited circumstance where the
actions by the payee induced action by the payor, see, e.g., Toronto-Dominion Bank, 753
F.2d at 66 (restitution denied unless payee's actions induced payor bank to miss the midnight
deadline); Chrysler Credit Corp., 582 F. Supp. at 1436 (restitution denied since there was no
reliance by the payor bank upon the representations by the plaintiff regarding the drawer's
account).
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213 and section 3-418.112 If, on the other hand, the alternative construction
of section 4-213 is accepted so that section 4-213 is construed consistently
with section 3-418 and the restrictions under section 3-418 apply in the
article 4 context,"' the term "accountable" in section 4-213 will mean
something different than it means in section 4-302. In other words, "ac-
countable" in section 4-213 would accommodate restitution when the pre-
senting party was neither a holder in due course, nor changed his position
in reliance on the payment, while "accountable" in section 4-302 would
not. In addition to attaching two different meanings to the same term, this
would result in the availability of restitution by the payor bank being
dependent upon the way in which final payment occurred. 54 When final
payment was made by undue retention, the absolute liability of section 4-
302 would be imposed; when final payment occurred by other means,
restitution would be allowed. Under this view, a payor bank, uncertain as
to the proper course of action with respect to a check, would be advised
to pay the check, thereby preserving the possibility of subsequent restitution.
The alternative of dishonoring the item or holding it past the applicable
deadline while deciding whether to pay it would create risks of liability to
the customer-drawer for wrongful dishonor,'55 or to the presenting party
for undue retention.
c. Section 4-302 Provides for Restitution
There is a third alternative interpretation of the Code sections at issue
that should be considered. This alternative is a variation of the second
alternative just discussed. As in the second alternative, section 4-213 is read
as providing when final payment occurs. The use of the word "final" in
section 4-213 distinguishes payment made under the provisions of section
4-213 from provisional settlement. The use of the term "accountable" in
152. For a discussion of this conflict, see supra notes 125-26 and accompanying text. Under
this construction, the restrictions found in § 3-418 apply only in an article 3 situation, and do
not apply under § 4-213 or § 4-302. For cases refusing to read the § 3-418 restrictions into
article 4, see, e.g., Ashford Bank, 544 F. Supp. at 26-27; Kirby v. First & Merchants Nat'l
Bank, 210 Va. 88, 168 S.E.2d 273 (1969); Northwestern Nat'l Ins. Co., 96 Wis. 2d at 155,
292 N.W.2d at 591.
153. For cases holding that the § 3-418 restrictions should be read into § 4-213, see, e.g.,
Park, 722 F.2d at 1303; Demos, 151 N.J. Super. at 489, 376 A.2d at 1352.
154. Courts appear to be applying this double standard presently without articulating the
method of payment as a determinative factor. Most of the cases in which a payor bank has
successfully raised the issue of restitution are cases in which the item was paid rather than
retained. See, e.g., Park, 722 F.2d at 1303; Ashford Bank, 544 F. Supp. at 26; First Nat'l
City Bank, 3 U.C.C. Rep. Serv. (Callaghan) at 815; Manufacturers Trust Co., 17 Misc. 2d at
909, 186 N.Y.S.2d at 917; Valley Bank, 74 Misc. 2d at 195, 343 N.Y.S.2d at 191.
155. If the dishonor was wrongful, the payor bank could face liability to the customer for
wrongful dishonor under § 4-402. See generally Dow, Damages and Proof in Cases of Wrongful
Dishonor: The Unsettled Issues Under U.C.C. Section 4-402, 63 WASH. U.L.Q. 237 (1985).
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section 4-213 merely puts noncash payments on the same footing as cash
payments. Where payment has become final under any of the noncash
methods of final payment, the payor has a duty to remit cash. The payor
has a duty to, in effect, put himself in the position that he would have
been in had payment been made in cash. Accountability would have no
effect upon the payor's rights to recover payments made by mistake.
In order to determine the effects of final payment, one looks to section
3-418 which allows restitution except against a holder in due course or one
who in good faith changed his position in reliance upon the payment. This
construction has support from courts and commentators, 5 6 as discussed
above. More importantly, each section is construed as an important com-
ponent of the Code, playing a useful role in determining the rights and
liabilities of the parties. The function of section 3-418 would be to limit
the restitutionary rights of the parties. While one objection to this approach
might be the language "[e]xcept for recovery of bank payments" in section
3-418, '1 it is argued that this clause applies only to the situation where the
payor bank was not accountable under section 4-213.
The next step in the analysis is to question the role that section 4-302
plays in this construction. Under this third alternative, the accountability
provision of section 4-302, in effect, mirrors the accountability provision
of section 4-213. Section 4-302 provides, accordingly, that the payor bank
which retains an item beyond the time limits specified without dishonoring
it, incurs the same liability as a payor bank that pays the item.' 5s The term
"accountability" is given the same interpretation under section 4-213 and
section 4-302. Under either section a payor bank which is accountable for
the item has a duty to account-to disburse funds for the item. Whether
or not the payor bank might be able to recover upon restitutionary principles
the funds disbursed is not dealt with in either article 4 section.15' That issue
is governed by section 3-418.
One major objection to this approach, discussed above, was the fact that,
for more than twenty years, courts have interpreted the accountability
156. See generally Finan, supra note 126; Note, Allocation, supra note 5; Comment, Broader
Liability, supra note 5.
157. One interpretation of this clause has been to exclude § 3-418 from applicability in all
cases of bank collections. See supra notes 12840 and accompanying text. Under this interpre-
tation, § 3-418 applies only where the funds have been disbursed. Edwards, supra note 126,
at 351.
158. Professor Leary states: "Thus, Section 4-302 must be interpreted as saying that the
effect of a late return falling in either of the two categories referred to in the section is just
as if the item had been finally paid, and case law is in agreement." Leary & Tarlow, supra
note 137, at 937 (footnote omitted) (citing Rock Island Auction Sales v. Empire Packing Co.,
32 Ill. 2d 269, 204 N.E.2d 721 (1965)).
159. Professor Leary asserts that such defenses would be available in a common law action
for an accounting and, therefore, should be available under article 4. See Leary, Reflections
of a Drafter, 43 OHIo ST. L.J. 557, 563 (1982); Leary & Schmitt, supra note 136, at 622.
[Vol. 65:779
RECOVERING MISTAKEN PA YMENTS
provision of section 4-302 as imposing a form of absolute liability. If the
term accountability in section 4-213 was interpreted to allow restitution (by
reference to section 3-418) and the same term in section 4-302 does not
allow restitution (absolute liability), the absurd result discussed above would
be reached. First, the same term "accountability" would be given one
interpretation in one section and a different interpretation in the other
section. Second, the situation might result where the payor bank's restitu-
tionary rights were solely dependent upon the manner in which final payment
occurred. Where final payment occurred by paying out funds, restitution
might be allowed, but where final payment occurred by undue retention,
no restitution would be permitted.
Bank accountability should create the same rights and obligations under
both Code sections. This result can be reached by a literal reading of section
4-302 which expressly allows for defenses to the absolute liability commonly
imposed by the courts. The section begins with an exception to accounta-
bility: "In the absence of a valid defense such as breach of a presentment
warranty .... settlement effected or the like . . . . 160 There is no doubt
that the payor bank can escape liability where there has been a breach of
presentment warranty. The use of the phrase "such as" in the introductory
language indicates, however, that the list of defenses is not an exhaustive
list. 6 1 Exception from accountability is made for breach of warranty,
settlement effected, "or the like." What exactly "or the like" entails is not
specified. It has been suggested that this clause refers to restitution.1 62 This
is a reasonable interpretation of the statutory language. Given the general
acceptance of restitution that existed prior to N.I.L. and Code enactment,
limited only by the restrictions of Price v. Neal, 63 it seems unlikely that
the drafters would have dramatically changed the common law treatment
without even mentioning the change in the comments.'6
This third interpretation attempts to reconcile the apparent inconsistencies
between statutory sections. If section 4-302 is interpreted to allow restitution,
the apparent inconsistencies between accountability under section 4-213 and
160. U.C.C. § 4-302 (emphasis added). It is not clear why a similar provision does not
appear in § 4-213. This can be explained if § 4-213 merely specifies the time final payment
occurs without specifying the effect of final payment. See supra notes 143-55 and accompanying
text. It is, however, difficult to read the accountability provision without concluding that at
least to some extent accountability is the effect of final payment. If the absence of any defenses
in § 4-213 supports a conclusion that an absolute duty to remit funds is created by final
payment (not necessarily a denial of subsequent restitution), why does § 4-302 seem to allow
for defenses to this duty to remit? This inconsistency is impossible to resolve satisfactorily.
161. Leary & Schmitt, supra note 136, at 623.
162. Id.
163. 97 Eng. Rep. 871 (K.B. 1762).
164. See Note, Allocation, supra note 5, at 1099. The author considers only the conflict
between §§ 3-418 and 4-213. No consideration is given to § 4-302. This is not uncommon. See
supra note 147.
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accountability under section 4-302, discussed above, are resolved. This
reconciliation is achieved in accordance with general Code principles and
objectives. Article 4 and, in particular, section 4-302 was designed to
promote the rapid processing of checks. 16 Payor banks were placed under
a duty to act promptly in deciding whether or not to pay, and were penalized
for failure to do so by requiring disbursement of the funds. This principle
is not, however, inconsistent with allowing subsequent restitution.'l 6
Inasmuch as this interpretation of section 4-302 is inconsistent with the
case law imposing absolute liability under section 4-302, one must conclude
that those cases were incorrectly decided. A careful reading of the majority
of undue retention cases reveals, however, that few of them directly address
the restitution issue. Most cases in which accountability has been equated
with absolute liability were cases in which the payor bank was being sued
to require disbursement of funds. Creation of an absolute duty to remit
funds is not necessarily inconsistent with allowing subsequent restitution.
Moreover, it is possible that, although the court did not discuss the fact,
in many undue retention cases the person receiving payment was a holder
in due course. 167
In a variation on this approach, it could be asserted that section 4-213
provides when final payment occurs. In order to determine the effect of
final payment, one must look to one of two places. If the item was finally
paid by undue retention, section 4-302 specifies that the payor bank should
be accountable for the item, subject to the defense provisions. If the item
was paid in any other manner, section 3-418 specifies final payment subject
to restitution. Neither final payment under section 3-418 nor accountability
under section 4-302 would eliminate restitutionary rights except where there
is a holder in due course or where there has been good faith reliance. The
need for a separate provision detailing the results of undue retention is
more easily understood in light of the fact that the concept of undue
retention was a new concept that had been the subject of some confusion
under the N.I.L.
While both variations reconcile the conflicting Code sections in a fairly
logical manner, they are not without problems. Most importantly, even if
one accepts the general premise that restitution should be available to a
payor bank which by mistake finally pays an item in the bank collection
process, it is unclear when restitution should be raised. In other words, can
165. U.C.C. § 4-101 Official Comment; Edwards, supra note 126, at 355; Hill, supra note
126, at 299; Note, Retention of a Check, supra note 118, at 116.
166. Whether restitution should be allowed as a defense in a suit to account or restricted
to a subsequent action to recover monies paid is unclear. To the extent, however, that finality
is an objective to be achieved by the final payment rule, see infra note 174 and accompanying
text, allowing restitution would be inconsistent with that objective.
167. See supra note 149.
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a payor bank assert restitution as a defense in a suit by the presenting party
to compel disbursement of funds, or is restitution limited to a suit by the
payor bank subsequent to disbursement? The answer is not apparent.
Interpreting the introductory language of section 4-302 as providing for
restitution would seem to permit its defensive use. There are, however, two
arguments against allowing defensive assertion of restitution. First, by its
very nature restitution generally seeks "restoration" of money paid by
mistake. Allowing restitution to be asserted in a defense would be inconsis-
tent with common law treatment. Second, under this approach the term
"accountable" is rendered almost meaningless. If the term does not even
require disbursement of funds, what does it require?
Alternatively, restitution could be limited to a subsequent lawsuit by the
payor bank to recover the funds disbursed. This would protect the expec-
tations of the parties in the bank collection process, and it is supported by
a literal reading of the term "accountable." Where final payment has
occurred without funds disbursement, the payor bank could best be put in
the same position as if it had, in fact, finally paid the item in cash by
creating an absolute duty on the part of the payor bank to disburse funds.' 61
It would, in addition, penalize the payor bank for its delay in the case of
undue retention.16
9
There are, however, three arguments against this interpretation. First, it
is inefficient to require two lawsuits where one would suffice. Second, if
an absolute duty to remit funds is required by the term accountable, what
is the function of the introductory language to section 4-302 providing for
certain defenses? Third, it is unclear whether a payor bank which was
forced to remit funds following a mistaken undue retention, but which
turned the funds over to the presenting party (plaintiff) with full knowledge
of the facts, would qualify for restitution. Under those circumstances the
payment would not have been made by mistake.
It is the conclusion of this Article that these sections, despite a number
of attempts, cannot be satisfactorily reconciled. Any satisfactory approach
must interpret the function of each Code section to create a logical, cohesive
scheme. In addition to the difficulty in statutory interpretation, court
treatment has added to, rather than resolved, the confusion. Indeed, the
conflicts between Code sections can, perhaps, best be illustrated by an
168. See U.C.C. § 4-213 Official Comment 7 (drafters specify that there is no need for
accountability where the payor "has paid the item in cash because such payment is itself a
sufficient accounting").
169. See supra notes 132-37 and accompanying text where the statutory history is recounted.
The accountable language was designed to impose a penalty upon the dilatory payor bank in
the case of undue retention. Even though a subsequent action for restitution would be allowed,
the payor bank would be penalized by the costs of litigating the second action. See Comment,
Broader Liability, supra note 5, at 825, where the author asserts that this expense would
encourage care on the part of the payor bank.
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examination of court treatment in the context of specific situations. Because
of the availability of warranty relief, the issue of restitution is unlikely to
arise in the context of forged indorsements. The issue is, instead, more
likely to be litigated in the instance of a forged drawer's signature or where
there are insufficient funds from which the check can be paid.
In the case where a check has been mistakenly paid over a forged drawer's
signature, courts typically ignore the conflict between Code sections and
apply section 3-418 even where the check has clearly entered the check
collection system.170 This results in allowing restitution where there is neither
a holder in due course nor good faith reliance. Those courts that do
recognize the conflict are split as to its resolution; some read the section 3-
418 restrictions into section 4-213 and some refuse to do so. 7 1
Additional problems arise in the process of applying the final payment
rule to the payment of insufficient funds checks. At common law; the
majority rule precluded restitution by the payor who paid an insufficient
funds check even if the check was paid by mistake. Given this common
law background, the conflict between Code sections takes on a new dimen-
sion. Even if the section 3-418 limitations are read into article 4, allowing
the assertion of restitution, its actual availability is dependent upon appli-
cable state law. Restitution would only be available to the payor bank where
it would be available at common law.172 In most cases where the payor
bank has delayed return of an insufficient funds check, even through
mistake, the accountability language of section 4-302 has operated to impose
absolute liability and preclude restitution. 7 1 It is, thus, evident that the
U.C.C. scheme fails to adequately address the question of whether or not
restitution is available in the bank collection context.
170. Perini Corp., 553 F.2d at 398; Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 85 Cal. App. 3d at 797, 149
Cal. Rptr. at 883; Payroll Check Cashing, 401 N.E.2d at 752; Maplewood Bank & Trust Co.,
142 N.J. Super. at 480, 362 A.2d at 44; Richardson Co., 504 S.W.2d at 812.
171. Compare Demos, 151 N.J. Super. at 489, 376 A.2d at 1352 with Ashford Bank, 544
F. Supp. at 26.
172. See, e.g., Park, 722 F.2d at 1303 (restitution permitted after mistaken payment of an
insufficient funds check since the common law in Ohio permitted restitution). The Park court's
emphasis on the language of § 3-418, which clearly applies to overdrafts (see U.C.C. § 3-418
Official Comment 2) has been misinterpreted as allowing restitution when permitted by § 3-
418 without reference to state law. Note, Easy Come, Easy Go, supra note 126, at 689-90.
173. This creates the anomalous situation in which the availability of restitution depends
upon whether the payor bank paid out the money for the item or retained it beyond the
midnight deadline. Restitution would be virtually nonexistent if the item was retained beyond
the midnight deadline, but might be possible if the item was paid. This, obviously, encourages
the payor to pay the item when in doubt and hope that the applicable state law allows
restitution. Whether or not restitution was available, even where the insufficient funds item
was paid, often depends upon whether restitution was available at common law in insufficient
funds situations in that particular state. Whether or not the payor is entitled to restitution,
therefore, might differ depending upon how the item was paid, and the common law of the
state where the item was paid.
[Vol. 65:779
RECOVERING MISTAKEN PA YMENTS
3. Summary of Article 4 Sections Under the
Narrow View of Displacement
It is clear that neither article 3 nor article 4 expressly displaces the
availability of restitution. Whether or not there has been implied Code
displacement, on the other hand, depends, in most instances, on whether
one adopts the narrow or expansive view of displacement. With respect to
the narrow view of displacement, restitution has been displaced by the
language of section 3-418 only with respect to payments made to a holder
in due course or to one who changed his position in reliance upon the
payment. The key question is whether restitution has been further displaced
under the language of article 4. It is not clear whether the language of
article 4 is inconsistent with restitution because the language itself is unclear.
Article 4 provides that upon final payment the payor bank is accountable
for the amount of the item, but the extent to which article 4 is inconsistent
with restitution depends upon the interpretation one gives to the term
accountable. If accountable is interpreted as absolutely liable, then this
would preclude restitution. If, however, the term accountable is interpreted
as requiring only that the payor bank disburse the funds (to, in effect, put
itself in the position that it would have been in had it effected final payment
in cash), restitution might be available. The extent to which restitution is
displaced is, therefore, unclear under the narrow view of displacement.
C. Restitution Within the Code Under the
Expansive View of Displacement
The unsettling result of Code analysis under the narrow view of displace-
ment is the primary reason for looking to the expansive view which considers
whether common law restitution is at odds with the broad purposes and
policies of the Code. Within the context of the check collection system, as
governed by articles 3 and 4, one important purpose or policy is finality of
commercial transactions, which entails the view that commerce requires an
end to commercial transactions. 17 4 Restitution of a mistaken payment ob-
viously conflicts with the policy of finality in that restitution allows a
transaction to be opened up at a time subsequent to the payment. This
could not, however, constitute sufficient justification to abolish restitution
from the Code scheme of check collections because both the transfer and
presentment warranties, which are expressly provided for in both article 3
and article 4, also clearly conflict with the policy of finality.
174. U.C.C. § 3-418 Official Comment 1.
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Another broad purpose of the Code is to promote certainty in matters
of commercial law. 175 The parties to a transaction should be able to ascertain
relevant law with a fairly high degree of certainty. With respect to recovering
mistaken payments it is clear that restitution is at odds with this policy.
First, there is significant disagreement among the states on several important
issues of restitution, particularly with respect to the mistaken payment of
insufficient fund and no account items. Supplementing the Code provisions
with this unsettled body of common law creates less certainty in transactions
governed by the Code. These variations among the states, when used to
supplement Code provisions, also conflict with the important Code policy
of uniformity. 76 Moreover, with respect to those matters over which there
might be uniform agreement under common law, restitution, which is based
on concepts of justice and fairness, is inherently uncertain and unpredictable
in its application. We have already seen that a defendant in a restitution
case may assert essentially any argument to show that it would not be
unjust to allow him to keep the mistaken payment. Delving into such things
as the relative financial worth of the parties hardly promotes certainty in
the law.
Up to this point, it appears that a consideration of Code policies points
to displacement of restitution; however, another policy within the Code
scheme of check collections must be considered-that of avoiding unjust
enrichment. It is clear that the drafters saw this as playing some role under
the Code. In fact, restitution is specifically called for under some circum-
stances.177
We can see from the above discussion that the statutory language is
deficient with respect to delineating the availability and scope of common
law restitution. It should also be apparent that the problem is more
fundamental than mere language deficiencies. The broad purposes and
policies of the Code, as evidenced by the statutory language and official
comments, simultaneously support and reject the availability of common
law restitution.
It is submitted that the root of the problems relating to recovering
mistaken payments under the Code lies in a substantive blunder made nearly
forty years ago by the drafters of the original articles 3 and 4. The blunder
was adopting a warranty theory of recovery while at the same time retaining
175. Great W. Bank & Trust Co., 138 Ariz. at 265, 674 P.2d at 328; R. Hnium, J.
McDONNELL & S. NICKLES, supra note 90, at 1.0612][a] and [c]; Gedid, U.C.C. Methodology:
Taking a Realistic Look at the Code, 29 WM. & MARY L. Rnv. 341, 354-59 (1988); Hillman,
supra note 69, at 655, 678-79.
176. U.C.C. § 1-102(2)(c); General Comment of N.C.C.U.S.L. and the A.L.I., I.U.L.A.
xv, (1989); see also Gedid, supra note 175, at 379; Hillman, supra note 69, at 655, 678-79;
Nickles I, supra note 64, at 13.
177. See U.C.C. § 4-407 (establishes certain rights "to prevent unjust enrichment"); supra
notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
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common law restitution. Evidence for this assertion is found by first looking
at pre-Code law.
Early in their common law development restitution and warranty func-
tioned as competing theories of recovering mistaken payments. As these
theories developed, however, they clearly diverged to the extent that they
would support different results in some cases even while generally adhering
to the Price v. Neal rule. The reason for this divergence is easy to see.
Freed from the change of position defense and the doctrinal baggage of
unjust enrichment, warranty became a much more streamlined basis of
recovery, which typically favored the plaintiff.'78 As a result of these
substantive differences, principally with respect to defenses, warranty and
restitution claims sometimes lead to different results under the same circum-
stances. Yet, the Code (both article 3 and article 4) expressly adopts warranty
as a basis of recovering mistaken payments while at the same time retains
common law restitution.
Incorporating these two distinct and potentially conflicting theories of
recovery results in a number of undesirable consequences. First, it greatly
complicates the body of law governing recovery of mistaken payments. Two
separate and independent bases of recovery exist with identical objectives,
namely, recovering mistaken payments. Instead of a unified theory of
recovery, courts must presently consider both bodies of law in each mistaken
payment case and face inconsistencies between the two.
Second, the presence of restitution invites uncertainty and lack of uni-
formity in the law of recovering mistaken payments. The uniformity that
is achieved through the detailed provisions of sections 3-417 and 4-207 is
considerably diminished by the interplay with restitution. This is due both
to the variations among the states as well as the inherent uncertainty of
restitution.
The third consequence relates to the policy rationale behind the warranty
provisions. In sections. 3-417 and 4-207 the drafters went to great lengths
to delineate carefully and specifically the warranties that are given on
presentment and to fashion numerous specific exceptions thereto. According
to the official comments, the purpose behind these provisions, both in
allowing recovery and in denying recovery, was to follow the rule in Price
v. Neal. The apparent comprehensiveness of this section is lessened consid-
erably when we see that a plaintiff who is unable to recover the mistaken
payment in a warranty action can pursue a restitutionary claim, sometimes
successfully. The policy behind denying warranty recovery under certain
circumstances is obviously frustrated by simultaneously allowing the plaintiff
another chance to achieve the same objective (recovering the payment) under
178. See 3 G. PALME, supra note 17, § 16.8; supra notes 81-83, 97, 112, and accompanying
text.
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an entirely different theory. This same problem can be considered from the
perspective of restitution as well. The policy behind denying restitution
under certain circumstances is frustrated by allowing the plaintiff, who is
unable to obtain restitution, to pursue a warranty action in order to recover
the payment.
The presence of two alternative and inconsistent theories of recovery
inevitably results in ambiguities within the article 4 provisions relating to
the accountability concept and mistaken payments. As a consequence of the
ambiguous relationship between warranty and restitution, the relationship
between restitution and the accountability concept of article 4 is ambiguous
as well. The language of section 4-302 expressly excepts breach of warranty
from the operation of the accountability concept in cases of undue retention,
but the section ignores the matter of how accountability relates to a
restitutionary claim through section 1-103. It has been argued that the
phrase "or the like" in section 4-302 encompasses a restitutionary claim,
but a significant number of courts and commentators have rejected this
interpretation. 1
A review of the drafting history of the Code fails to clearly establish why
the drafters adopted a warranty theory of recovery while retaining common
law restitution. The confusion may be at least partly due to the drafters'
failure to analyze and synthesize pre-Code, especially pre-N.I.L., case law.
It may be also partly due to the drafters simultaneously embracing conflict-
ing policies with respect to recovering mistaken payments without adequately
addressing the interplay between these policies and the resolution of such
conflicts. With this background in mind it is now appropriate to consider
the proposed changes to articles 3 and 4 and see how, if at all, these
problems have been addressed.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPOSED CHANGES TO ARTICLE 3 AND 4
PROVISIONS RELATING TO MISTAKEN PAYMENTS
The drafting project to revise articles 3 and 4 presents a rare and valuable
opportunity to correct drafting errors in the present versions of these articles
and fashion a permanent statutory solution to the problem of recovering
mistaken bank payments. The proposed revisions include a limited number
of substantive changes in the sections that relate to recovering mistaken
payments. These will be analyzed and discussed in this section.
Like the current Code, the R.U.C.C. retains warranty as the primary
basis of recovering mistaken payments. For clarity, the R.U.C.C. drafters
179. See supra notes 160-64 and accompanying text; see also Rogers, supra note 55, at 945
n.54 (the author also finds fault with "parallel systems" of liability in the check collection
system).
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have separated transfer warranties and presentment warranties into two
different sections, R.U.C.C. sections 3-416 and 3-418,180 and have distin-
guished presentment warranties made to drawees of unaccepted drafts from
those made to acceptors of drafts and makers of notes."8 ' These changes
are proposed in order to avoid the complicated exceptions to the presentment
warranty found in current sections 3-417 and 4-207; however, the overall
structure and substance of both types of warranties are unchanged.
8 2 Just
as under section 3-417 of the current Code, the presenter warrants under
R.U.C.C. section 3-418 that all indorsements necessary to pass title are
genuine and that there are no material alterations.183 With respect to
presentment of unaccepted drafts to drawees, the R.U.C.C. follows the
current Code in excluding a warranty of a genuine drawer's signature by
warranting only that the presentor has no knowledge that the drawer's
signature is forged.1 4 Although the R.U.C.C. warranty provisions embody
no significant substantive changes from the Code provisions, one must
consider the role that restitution will play in recovering mistaken payments
under the R.U.C.C.
U.C.C. section 3-418, one of the key Code sections dealing with restitu-
tion, has been replaced by R.U.C.C. section 3-419.111 At first glance, it
180. R.U.C.C §§ 3-416, 3-418. According to § 4-304 these warranties apply in a case
otherwise governed by article 4. Id. § 4-304(1). For a discussion of warranties under the Code,
see supra notes 91-97 and accompanying text.
181. R.U.C.C. § 3-418(a), (d); see also id. § 3-418 Official Comment 1.
182. Id. The drafters acknowledge that the R.U.C.C. presentment warranties duplicate the
substance of the current Code warranties by stating in the prefatory note that the "warranties
are restated but they do not change existing law." See id. § 3-418 Official Comment 2; id.
Prefatory Note vi.
183. R.U.C.C. § 3-418(a)(1), (a)(2). Like the current Code, this part of R.U.C.C. § 3-418
does not refer to genuineness of indorsements. Instead, it refers to being "entitled to enforce
the draft or authorized to obtain payment ...... Id. § 3-418(a)(1). Inasmuch as such entitlement
or authority is dependent upon the genuineness of indorsements necessary to pass title, the
warranty under this subsection is essentially a warranty that these indorsements are genuine.
184. Id. § 3-418(a)(3). The only substantive change is the addition in article 4 of a warranty
with respect to M.I.C.R. encoding. Id. § 4-208(1). The warranty is one of accuracy in encoding
and subjects the warrantor to liability for loss caused by overencoding or underencoding. This
warranty appears only in article 4 because problems with encoding are unique to the check
collection process. For a discussion of the use of M.I.C.R. in the check collection system, see
Bank Leumi Trust Co. v. Bally's Park Place, 528 F. Supp. 349 (S.D.N.Y. 1981); R.U.C.C. §
4-208 Official Comments 1 & 2; N. PENNY & D. BAKER, THE LAW OF ELECTRONIC FUND
TRANSFER SYSTEMS § 1.02, at 1-19 to 1-29 (1980).
185. Section 3-419 states:
(a) Except as provided in subsection (c), if the drawee of a draft pays or
accepts the draft and the drawee acted on the mistaken belief that (i) payment
of the draft had not been stopped under Section 4-403, (ii) the signature of the
purported drawer of the draft was authorized, or (iii) the balance in the drawer's
account with the drawee represented available funds, the drawee may recover the
amount paid from the person to whom or for whose benefit payment was made
or, in the case of acceptance, may revoke the acceptance. Rights of the drawee
under this subsection are not affected by negligence of the drawee in paying or
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appears to entail a number of changes from U.C.C. section 3-418. Deter-
mining whether these changes are substantive, however, requires closer
analysis.
R.U.C.C. section 3-419, entitled "Payment or Acceptance By Mistake,"
deals with mistaken payment or acceptance of an instrument. Subsection
(a) governs mistaken payment or acceptance by a drawee of three types of
drafts: 1) those paid over a stop payment order, 2) those containing a
forged drawer's signature, and 3) those drawn on insufficient funds.8 6
Subsection (b) governs all other types of mistaken payment or acceptance
cases. 87 This arrangement raises four related issues. First, why did the
drafters establish this division between types of mistake cases rather than
treat all mistaken payments and acceptances under one provision? Second,
to what extent is the right of recovery under subsection (a) different from
that under subsection (b)? Third, what types of mistaken payments or
acceptances fall within subsection (b)? Fourth, on what basis were these
types of mistake cases relegated to subsection (b) coverage?
The comments to R.U.C.C. section 3-419 state that subsection (a) "applies
to the most common cases in which the problem is presented."' 8  The
"problem" referred to here is presumably that of mistaken payments and
acceptances. It is likely, however, that the most common type of mistaken
payment is a payment over a forged indorsement, 1s9 but this type of case
is not among those enumerated in subsection (a). The drafters may have
intended the subsection to cover the most common types of mistake cases
not included under the R.U.C.C. section 3-418 presentment warranty pro-
visions. 19 This interpretation, however, is questionable because forged draw-
accepting the instrument.
(b) Except as provided in subsection (c), if an instrument has been paid or
accepted by mistake and the case is not covered by subsection (a), the person
paying or accepting may recover the amount paid or revoke acceptance to the
extent allowed by the law governing mistake and restitution.
(c) The remedies provided by subsection (a) or (b) may not be asserted against
a person having rights of a holder in due course of the instrument or a person
that in good faith changed position in reliance on the payment or acceptance of
the instrument. This subsection does not limit remedies provided by Section 3-
418 for breach of warranty.
R.U.C.C. § 3-419.
186. Id. § 3-419(a).
187. Id. § 3-419(b).
188. Id. § 3-419 Official Comment 1.
189. Although insufficient fund and no-account checks make up a large majority of "bad
checks," they constitute a minor part of checks mistakenly paid because, as Professor
Farnsworth states, they are "almost invariably detected by the drawee and dishonored."
Farnsworth, Insurance, supra note 45, at 297 (footnote omitted). Because the payor bank has
no effective means of detecting a forged or otherwise unauthorized indorsement prior to
payment, they probably are the most common type of mistaken payment.
190. Those warranty provisions deal with forged indorsements, knowledge of a forged
drawer's signature, and material alteration. R.U.C.C. § 3-418(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(3).
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ers' signatures, which are referred to in subsection (a), are also included in
those warranty provisions. 19'
It is most likely that the reasoning behind covering three types of mistake
cases in subsection (a) and leaving the rest covered by subsection (b), was
to take what the drafters perceived as the most common types of mistake
cases and fashion specific rules as to when recovery is allowed and when it
is precluded. This would clarify the law of mistake in these types of cases
by avoiding the uncertainty and diversity of common law restitutionary
doctrine which through U.C.C. section 1-103 has resulted in myriad prob-
lems in mistake cases under the current Code. The other types of mistake
cases not included in subsection (a) were deemed relatively unimportant.
They were left to be resolved under common law restitutionary doctrine
despite the substantial risks of uncertainty and diversity. This interpretation
makes sense, however, only if the recovery right under subsection (a) is
reasonably definite and the nature of that right is different from that under
subsection (b).
The text of the proposed statute suggests that the recovery right under
subsection (a) is different from that under subsection (b). Subsection (a)
provides that in the specified types of mistake cases the drawee "may
recover" the payment.' 92 This right is limited only by the holder in due
course and change of position defense provided in subsection (c). 93 Subsec-
tion (b) provides that in mistake cases "not covered by subsection (a)" the
person paying "may recover" the payment. This latter right of recovery is
subject, however, not only to the holder in due course and change of
position defenses under subsection (c); it is also available only "to the
extent allowed by the law governing mistake and restitution."'' 94 The use of
the different language in each subsection supports the notion that the nature
of the right in each subsection is also different. If the drafters intended the
recovery rights in both subsections to be identical it is reasonable to suppose
that they would have used identical language. Moreover, having identical
recovery rights in both subsections would vitiate the need for distinct
subsections.
There is, on the other hand, language in the comment to R.U.C.C. section
3-419 that suggests the recovery rights in subsections (a) and (b) may be
the same. The comment provides that "[p]roposed Section 3-419 specifically
states the right of restitution in subsection (a) and (b)."' 91 On one level this
suggests that the recovery rights in both subsection (a) and (b) are the same.
The comment makes no distinction between "the right of restitution" stated
191. Id. § 3-418(a)(3).
192. Id. § 3-419(a).
193. Id. § 3-419(a), (c).
194. Id. § 3-419(b); see also id. § 3-419 Official Comment 2.
195. Id. § 3-419 Official Comment 1.
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in subsection (a) from that stated in subsection (b). Read on another level,
however, this portion of the comment is compatible with viewing the
recovery right in subsection (a) as distinct from that in subsection (b). The
use of the term "restitution" in the comment probably is not used to denote
the body of common law rules and principles examined in Part II of this
Article. Rather, it appears to be used in a more general sense of recovering
or restoring a payment. This more general use is in contrast with how the
term "restitution" appears to be used in subsection (b). Assuming that the
recovery right in subsection (a) is different from that in subsection (b), we
must next examine the nature of those rights and see how they compare
with each other and with restitution under the present Code.
The nature of the recovery right under subsection (b) of R.U.C.C. section
3-419 is relatively clear. In the comment to that section the R.U.C.C.
drafters describe the majority view that U.C.C. section 3-418 does not create
a right of restitution in mistaken payment cases. Instead, that right is found
in the common law and incorporated into the Code through section 1-103.
Section 3-418 limits that right primarily through the use of the holder in
due course and change of position defenses.96 In comment 1 to R.U.C.C.
section 3-419 the drafters then indicate that, in contrast to the present Code,
that section "specifically states the right of restitution in subsection (a) and
(b).' 19 7 Looking at the language of subsection (b), it is apparent that the
right of restitution stated there exists only "to the extent allowed by the
law governing mistake and restitution.' 19 The law referred to here could
be nothing other than the common law. Moreover, in comment 2 to
R.U.C.C. section 3-419 the drafters state that subsection (b) "directs courts
to deal with those cases under the law governing mistake and restitution."' 199
This body of law to which the courts are directed could be nothing other
than common law restitution. It is, therefore, fairly clear that the subsection
states the right of restitution but does not change the nature of that right
from the common law. In this way subsection (b) expressly incorporates
common law restitution. With respect to limits on restitution we see that
(as under present section 3-418) recovery under subsection (b) is expressly
subject to the holder in due course and change of position defenses under
subsection (c). Moreover, by allowing recovery only to the extent that
recovery would be allowed under common law restitution, the defendant
may assert a potentially large array of equitable and legal arguments in
order to show that restitution of the payment should not be granted.
In contrast to subsection (b), ascertaining the nature of the recovery right
in subsection (a) is much more problematic. The comment to section 3-419
196. Id. For a discussion of present § 3-418, see supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text.
197. R.U.C.C. § 3-419 Official Comment 1.
198. Id. § 3-419(b).
199. Id. § 3-419 Official Comment 2.
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specifies that the "right of restitution" is stated not only in subsection (b)
but in subsection (a) as well." The right of restitution stated in subsection
(b) is common law restitution expressly incorporated into the subsection.
This suggests that the recovery right in subsection (a) is a common law
restitutionary right as well. It is clear, however, that the language of
subsection (a) is very different from that found in subsection (b). Unlike
subsection (b) which allows recovery only "to the extent allowed by the law
governing mistake and restitution," 20' the right of recovery in subsection
(a) is not similarly limited. It provides that if the drawee mistakenly pays
a draft over a stop payment order, a draft with a forged drawer's signature,
or a draft drawn on insufficient funds, the drawee "may recover the amount
paid." 20 It is expressly limited only by the holder in due course and change
of position defenses of subsection (c). A critical question is whether this
recovery right is modified or limited by anything else. This depends on
whether the recovery right in subsection (a) displaces common law restitution
or codifies common law restitution. If it displaces common law restitution,
then the right in subsection (a) should be considered a statutory right created
by the language of the subsection and limited only by the defenses specified
in subsection (c) or other Code provisions. If, on the other hand, it codifies
common law restitution, then the drawee's recovery right is subject not only
to the statutory defenses in subsection (c), but also to other defenses under
common law restitution. This includes any legal or equitable argument that
the defendant can assert to show that it is not unjust to retain the mistaken
payment. As the following analysis of section 3-419 shows, the answer to
this question is far from certain.
In the comment to R.U.C.C. section 3-419, the drafters state that the
section "specifically states the right of restitution in subsection (a) and
(b)."'23 Using the term "restitution" rather than a more general term such
as "recovery" supports the notion that both subsection (a) and (b) embody
common law restitution rather than a newly created statutory recovery right.
Moreover, the comment implies that the recovery right in subsection (a) is
the same as that in subsection (b). From the analysis of the statutory
language of section 3-419 and its comments, it is fairly clear that the right
embodied in subsection (b) is common law restitution. The recovery right
embodied in subsection (a) would, therefore, be common law restitution as
well. The comment to section 3-419 and the Prefatory Note both refer to
Price v. Neal. The comment states that subsections (a) and (c) "incorporate
the rule of Price v. Neal.' '2 4 Notwithstanding the two centuries of debate
200. Id. § 3-419 Official Comment 1.
201. Id. § 3-419(b).
202. Id. § 3-419(a).
203. Id. § 3-419 Officia Comment 1.
204. Id.; id. Prefatory Note vi.
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over that case, one thing is clear: Price v. Neal was a common law restitution
case. This suggests that the recovery right in subsection (a) is common law
restitution. Finally, subsection (a) states that the "[r]ights of the drawee
under this subsection are not affected by negligence of the drawee in paying
or accepting the instrument." 05 If subsection (a) does not embody common
law restitution, why is it necessary for the statute to address the effect of
the drawee's negligence on the recovery right? A plaintiff's negligence is
recognized by only a minority of courts as a defense to a restitution claim
in mistaken payment cases. It seems that if subsection (a) embodies a new
statutory right which is both created as well as limited by the terms of
section 3-419, there is no need to specify things that do not affect the
plaintiff's recovery right. Moreover, it infers that things not mentioned in
the statutory language, such as other defenses in a common law restitution
case, may affect that right. 206
There are, on the other hand, several arguments that support interpreting
subsection (a) as embodying a new statutory right. The first is, of course,
the language of the statute. The difference between the language of subsec-
205. Id. § 3-419(a).
206. This language raises another troublesome issue. The drawee's recovery right under
subsection (a) is not available when there is a holder in due course of the mistakenly paid
item. In Official Comment I to this section, the drafters state that in most cases there will be
a holder in due course of the mistakenly paid item, and, therefore, in most cases the drawee
will be unable to recover. By raising the matter of the effect of the drawee's negligence on
recovery the drafters are raising an issue that, according to their comment, is not very
important. The effect of the drawee's negligence is not addressed in present § 3-418 or its
comments. Those comments, however, do address the issue of the effect of the defendant's
negligence. The comments clarify an issue under the N.I.L. by stating that the defendant's
negligence will not preclude protection under the final payment rule unless the negligence
amounts to a lack of good faith. U.C.C. § 3-418 Official Comment 4 (1987); see supra notes
102-04 and accompanying text. The R.U.C.C. drafters have dropped this issue completely
from the R.U.C.C. The effect of the defendant's negligence is not dealt with in R.U.C.C. §
3-419 or its comments.
We can expect that this will be a source of problems in cases litigated under the R.U.C.C.
Dropping this comment from the R.U.C.C. may (at least for some courts) infer that the
R.U.C.C. drafters intended to change this rule, making the defendant's negligence preclude
holder in due course status under § 3-419. If, as the drafters suggest, there will usually be a
holder in due course of the mistakenly paid item, the effect of negligence on holder in due
course status is very pertinent. It should be addressed by the R.U.C.C. drafters. Although a
majority of pre-Code cases made the negligence of the defendant (recipient of the mistaken
payment) preclude protection under the rule, one commentator noted that the cases are in
"hopeless conflict" over establishing uniform standards of negligence. O'Malley, supra note
5, at 205 n.93. The R.U.C.C. drafters may be inviting a return of this conflict. For a case
discussing some problems created by making the recipient's negligence relevant, see First Nat'l
Bank v. Bank of Wyndmere, 15 N.D. 299, 303, 108 N.W. 546, 548 (1906); supra notes 50,
71, 104.
Another issue relating to the defendant's negligence is raised when we consider the change
of position defense which is also provided in subsection (c). At common law the change of
position must be, inter alia, non-negligent to constitute a defense in a restitutionary action.
See supra note 35 and accompanying text. Because a change of position is a defense under
R.U.C.C. § 3-419, the drafters should address the issue of negligence in this context as well.
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tion (b), which allows recovery only "to the extent" allowed under common
law restitution, and subsection (a), which limits the recovery right only by
the holder in due course and change of position defenses in subsection (c),
strongly suggests that the recovery right in subsection (a) is not common
law restitution. Second, the language of comment 2 to section 3-419 states
that subsection (b) "directs the courts" to apply common law restitution.
The comment contains no language of similar import with respect to
subsection (a). This also suggests that the recovery right embodied in
subsection (a) is not common law restitution. Third, with respect to the
reference to the rule of Price v. Neal, we have already seen that even though
the case was a restitution case, the rule of the case is compatible with other
bases of recovery. The rule is compatible with warranty, and presumably,
with other theories of recovery as well. Perhaps the most compelling reason
for concluding that the recovery right in subsection (a) is a statutory right
rather than common law restitution is that if the recovery rights in these
two subsections are the same, it vitiates the reason for treating mistake
cases in two different subsections. The R.U.C.C. drafters must be faulted
for falling to clarify the statutory language, or at least failing to clarify this
issue in the comments to section 3-419.m Nevertheless, we believe that the
language of subsection (a) should be construed as creating a new statutory
right of recovery while subsection (b) codifies common law restitution.2 8
207. With respect to the reasoning behind the distinction between subsections (a) and (b),
in both the comments to § 3-419 and the Prefatory Note the drafters focus on the idea that
subsection (a) covers specific types of mistake cases, but there is clearly inadequate attention
given to the issue of how the recovery right in subsection (a) differs from that in subsection
(b). R.U.C.C. § 3-419 Official Comments; id. Prefatory Note vi.
208. Replacing present § 3-418 with R.U.C.C. § 3-419 creates a potential problem with
respect to the concept of final payment. Under the majority interpretation of the Code, the
right of recovery is that found in common law restitution. Present § 3-418 makes a mistaken
payment final by limiting those restitutionary rights under certain circumstances. See R.U.C.C.
§ 3-419 Official Comment 1; supra notes 100-15 and accompanying text. The R.U.C.C. drafters
state that § 3-419 replaces present § 3-418. It is, however, not clear that the function of § 3-
418 has been replaced by R.U.C.C. § 3-419 because the purpose of § 3-419 is very different
than that of present § 3-418. In § 3-419 the R.U.C.C. drafters have created a statutory right
of recovery in subsection (a) and expressly codified common law restitution in subsection (b).
In this sense § 3-419 has replaced the need to look to the common law through § 1-103 to
find a right to recovery, but it has not replaced the function of § 3-418 which is to limit that
right. This makes it necessary to ask what makes payment final under the R.U.C.C. Subsection
(c) of § 3-419 specifies that the recovery rights under subsections (a) and (b) "may not be
asserted against" a holder in due course or one who changed position in reliance on the
payment. This subsection (c) limitation limits the recovery rights under subsections (a) and
(1). The subsection clearly states that it does not limit recovery under warranty; however, it
may be read as not limiting a recovery right from some other source. By specifying the
circumstances in which recovery is available one can obviously infer from the statutory language
that recovery is not available (i.e. payment is final) in other circumstances. Nevertheless, in
order to avoid potentially inconsistent interpretations by the courts, the R.U.C.C. drafters
should specify in the statutory language or the comment that in cases where a mistaken
payment cannot be recovered pursuant to subsections (a) and (c) the payment is final.
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The next matter to be addressed is that of ascertaining what types of mistake
cases fall within the coverage of subsection (b).
The language of subsection (a) is very clear with respect to the types of
mistake cases that fall within its coverage. It applies when the drawee
mistakenly pays or accepts a draft on which payment has been stopped, or
which contains a forged drawer's signature, or which was drawn on insuf-
ficient funds. The comments to section 3-419 resolve some confusion that
exists under the present Code by elaborating on the concept of "mistake"
that is employed by the statute. 209 As described by the drafters, this concept
is similar to that found in common law restitution. It does, however, expand
the scope of recovery. 210 Although comment 2 to section 3-419 elaborates
at great length on the nature of mistake within the context of insufficient
funds cases, the drafters do not address numerous other aspects of the
concept. Some of these can be adequately dealt with by using the discussion
on insufficient funds cases as an analogy. Nevertheless, many questions will
remain. When a court confronts such a question, to what body of law or
principles should the court look for guidance? The most obvious choice is
common law restitution which provides a well-developed doctrine on the
concept of mistake. Thus, even though the recovery right in subsection (a)
209. R.U.C.C. § 3-419 Official Comment 1. The confusion is generated not by U.C.C. §
3-418, but by differences among the courts over what constitutes a mistake sufficient to justify
common law restitution read into the Code through § 1-103.
210. The statement in the text is made with some qualification. Case #1 mentioned in
Official Comment 1 deals with a situation where the drawee pays an item drawn on insufficient
funds, intending to pay it as an overdraft, and subsequently seeks reimbursement from its
customer, the drawer of the draft. By concluding that no mistake sufficient to trigger recovery
under the statute is made under these circumstances the drafters are in agreement with common
law restitution. It should be noted, however, that even if the drawee makes a deliberate
decision not to check the state of the account, this is characterized as conscious ignorance
which, at common law, is not considered a mistake sufficient to trigger restitution.
Case #2 deals with a situation where the drawee negligently fails to ascertain whether the
drawer's account contains sufficient funds to pay the draft. By concluding that a mistake
triggering recovery is made under these circumstances the drafters are not in agreement with
the majority view at common law. Although negligence, in general, did not preclude recovery
at common law, Case #2 conflicts with the common law because it allows recovery of a
mistakenly paid insufficient funds item. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
It appears that Case #3 also represents somewhat of a departure from common law restitution.
Although common law doctrine does not address current funds availability legislation, it does
deal with cases where the drawee expects items deposited by the customer to be collected, but
such items are instead dishonored. The drafters state that "if the bank mistakenly believed
that the credit balance represented available funds," there is a mistake sufficient to trigger
recovery. This result appears contrary to the position taken by courts on this issue. See, e.g.,
Lowe's of Sanford, Inc. v. Mid-So. Bank & Trust Co., 44 N.C. App. 365, 260 S.E.2d 801
(1979); Demos v. Lyons, 151 N.J. Super. 489, 376 A.2d 1352 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.
1977). Nevertheless, because recovery in this circumstance is subject to the holder in due course
and change of position defenses, the result should be in line with common law restitution.
Note that the use of the concept of mistake from common law restitution supports the
argument that the recovery right in subsection (a) is common law restitution rather than a
statutory right.
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is a statutory one rather than common law restitution, common law resti-
tution will be relevant in ascertaining the contours of that right.
The next step is obviously one of determining what types of mistake cases
fall within subsection (b). The statutory language of section 3-419, the
comments to that section, and the Prefatory Note all indicate that subsection
(b) covers mistaken payment or acceptance cases "not covered by subsection
(a)." 211 Under a literal reading of this language, subsection (b) would include
any type of mistaken payment of a note as well as any mistaken payment
or acceptance of a draft other than the three types enumerated in subsection
(a). The critical question here is whether this includes those types of mistake
cases covered by the presentment warranty provisions of R.U.C.C. section
3-418. A literal reading of the statutory language suggests that it does.
Mistake cases "not covered by subsection (a)" would include items mistak-
enly paid or accepted on a forged indorsement as well as a material
alteration.
Such a reading would settle the matter were it not for ambiguous
statements in the first comment of section 3-419. After discussing subsection
(a) and the way in which it relates to subsection (c), the drafters state that
"[t]he remedy of a drawee to recover funds paid on bad checks is principally
found in Section 3-418," which, of course, is the presentment warranty
provision.2 2 This statement raises several issues. First of all, the reference
here to "bad checks" is unclear. It is nowhere defined in the R.U.C.C.,
nor is it defined in the U.C.C. Presumably, it is distinct from the term
"forged checks," which is also used but not defined in the same comment.
It is troublesome to encounter such an ambiguous term in the comment,
the purpose of which is to clarify statutory language and intent. Nevertheless,
it is reasonable to assume that the term "bad check" encompasses all checks
that for a variety of reasons, such as forgeries, material alterations, and
insufficient funds, are mistakenly paid.23 By saying that the "principal"
remedy in bad check cases is found in section 3-418 the drafters infer that
section 3-419 provides a secondary or complementary remedy in bad check
cases. The problem here is to ascertain the extent to which these remedial
sections overlap.
211. R.U.C.C. § 3-419(b); id. Official Comment 2; id. Prefatory Note vi.
212. Id. § 3-419 Official Comment 1.
213. A number of writers and courts use the term "forged check" to refer to a check
containing a forged drawer's signature, and the drafters appear to follow this usage. In the
portion of comment 1 discussing the results of suits under § 3-418, the drafters distinguish
between forged indorsement cases, alteration cases, and forged check cases. It would be
inappropriate to equate "bad check" with checks that are not "properly payable" as that
phrase is used in the Code. The drafters apparently include insufficient fund items within the
concept of "bad checks," yet insufficient fund items are clearly properly payable as the
concept is used under U.C.C. § 4-401. U.C.C. § 4-401.
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Comment 1 to section 3-419 states that the "drawee wins in forged
indorsement cases," citing a section 3-418 warranty provision, and in
"alteration cases," citing another section 3-418 warranty provision.2 4 It
then states that the drawee "loses in forged check [forged drawer's signa-
ture?] cases unless the warrantor had knowledge of the forgery," citing
another section 3-418 warranty provision. 2 5 We know, however, that the
drawee does not "lose" if the defendant is not a holder in due course or
did not change his position in reliance on the payment or acceptance because
in such a case recovery is available under subsection (a) of section 3-419.
It is fairly clear, therefore, that at least with one type of mistake case,
namely forged drawer's signature, both section 3-418 and section 3-419
apply. Accordingly, the drawee could assert either section depending on the
circumstances. A section 3-418 warranty could be asserted if the defendant
had knowledge of the forgery. Section 3-419 subsection (a) could be asserted
if the defendant is not a holder in due course and can show no change of
position. Under this interpretation, both section 3-418 presentment warranty
and subsection (a) statutory recovery right exist within the R.U.C.C. as
independent and potentially conflicting bases of recovery. There is no reason
to assume that other types of mistake cases (such as forged indorsements
and material alterations) which fall within the section 3-418 warranty pro-
visions do not also fall within subsection (b) of section 3-419. A drawee
who for some reason cannot prevail in a section 3-418 presentment warranty
action can assert, perhaps successfully, a restitutionary claim under section
3-419. From this analysis we can conclude that subsection (b) covers any
type of mistaken payment of a note as well as any mistaken payment or
acceptance of a draft other than the three types enumerated in subsection
(a), even though it may also be covered under the section 3-418 presentment
warranty provisions.
As a result of this interplay between sections 3-418 and 3-419, the
R.U.C.C. rules on the recovery of mistaken payments are unnecessarily
complex. It appears that, in this regard, the R.U.C.C. suffers from basically
the same problem as the U.C.C. Instead of a unified theory of recovery in
mistaken payment cases, the R.U.C.C. drafters have followed the original
Code drafters by adopting different theories of recovery that are independent
and potentially conflicting. More than one theory may be applicable to a
particular mistake case. One effect of this is to undermine the policy
rationale behind each theory. In this regard, the R.U.C.C. may be worse
than the U.C.C. because the R.U.C.C. has three, rather than two, inde-
pendent theories of recovery, namely warranty under section 3-418, common
law restitution under section 3-419(b), and a statutory recovery right under
214. R.U.C.C. § 3-419 Official Comment 1 (citing R.U.C.C. § 3-418(a)(1), (a)(2)).
215. Id. (citing R.U.C.C. § 3-418(a)(3)).
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section 3-419(a). One could avoid some of the potential conflicts between
sections 3-418 and 3-419 by construing subsection (b) of 3-419 as not
covering the types of mistake cases that are covered by the section 3-418
warranty provisions. With three independent theories of recovery, however,
the R.U.C.C. scheme would remain unnecessarily complex.
Leaving certain types of mistake cases out of subsection (a) creates new
problems in the R.U.C.C. Although the drafters state that the cases in
subsection (a) are the most common types of mistake cases, we have already
seen that these are probably not the most common types. Forged indorse-
ments are probably the most common type. This error suggests that the
drafters are not sufficiently aware of the common law background on these
issues. The drafters took what they thought were the most common types
of cases not covered in the warranty provisions, put them into a separate
section, and created specific rules on when recovery of the mistaken payment
is allowed. Making this distinction between types of mistaken payments on
the basis of frequency of occurrence creates a significant problem.
The problem created by this type of distinction is that no account cases
were left out of subsection (a), presumably because they are not a common
type of mistake case. However, doing so opens the possibility that courts
will treat no account cases differently than insufficient fund cases even
though they were treated the same at common law and should, on policy
grounds, be treated the same under the Code. Leaving the rest of the
mistake cases under subsection (b) invites courts to take approaches con-
flicting with the common law and with each other. Diversity on these
matters is inevitable.
Inasmuch as the R.U.C.C. constitutes a major revision of the Code,
perhaps the drafters should take the time to analyze the other types of
mistake cases, such as no account cases, and put them under subsection (a)
where appropriate. If a type of case does not fit within the subsection (a)
rules, they should fashion new language in another subsection to set forth
the circumstances under which recovery is allowed. As it stands, the way
the drafters dealt with this matter suggests that they have not taken the
time to follow through on some of the less common types of mistake cases.
To the extent that these other types of mistake cases should be treated
differently than the subsection (a) types, such treatment should be based
on a rational policy or set of policies regarding recovery of mistaken
payments rather than on the frequency of their occurrence.
It is not clear what the drafters' rationale was in fashioning these
R.U.C.C. sections. It may be that they were not cognizant of the common
law background of mistaken payments and the tension between the resti-
tution and warranty theories, or how this tension manifests itself in the
Code. The comments to the relevant R.U.C.C. sections suggest that the
drafters may not have adequately considered the relationship between
R.U.C.C. sections 3-418 and 3-419. For example, in comment 1 to section
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3-419 the drafters state that the "section covers payment or acceptance by
mistake and replaces present Section 3-418."216 It is obvious, however, that
section 3-418 also covers mistaken payment and acceptance. Likewise, in
the Prefatory Note the drafters point out that the rationale for the structure
of section 3-419 is "the doctrine of Price v. Neal. '"217 This offers little
guidance in resolving the issues we have raised. As discussed above, there
are at least ten different rationales for that case, and several of them are
conflicting. Holding up Price v. Neal as a rationale for the changes proposed
in section 3-419 confuses rather than clarifies the issues.
Perhaps as a result of the drafters' failure to resolve adequately the
problems with respect to restitution and warranty in mistaken payment
cases, the R.U.C.C. also fails to resolve adequately the problems with
respect to the relationship between the R.U.C.C. section 3-419 recovery
rights and the provisions of article 4. The R.U.C.C. proposes to eliminate
the provisional settlement, final settlement, and final payment terminology.
Instead, payment would occur upon "settlement" by the payor bank.2 1 8 In
the typical bank collection case, settlement (and thus payment) would occur
when the credit entry was made accompanying an item's physical present-
ment to the payor bank. 219
R.U.C.C. section 4-301 specifies the procedure by which the payor bank
can dishonor the item after payment by returning the item before its
midnight deadline. 220 Section 4-302, retaining the present accountability
concept, applies only if settlement has not been made. 2' Revised article 4
fails, however, to address the question of whether restitution might be used
by a payor bank to recover mistaken payments after the midnight deadline.
A payor bank would be entitled to recover where there has been a breach
of presentment warranty. 2 The question the R.U.C.C. drafters have not
216. Id. § 3-419 Official Comment 1.
217. Id. Prefatory Note vi.
218. Id. § 4-215(1).
219. Id. § 4-213(2)(d). Settlement might also occur, with respect to settlement by credit in
an account in a Federal Reserve Bank, when the credit becomes final. Id. § 4-213(2)(b).
220. Id. § 4-301(1). The return of the item under R.U.C.C. § 4-301 is theoretically different
from present § 4-301. Under present § 4-301, the payor bank that returns the item by its
midnight deadline is permitted to revoke its provisional settlement and avoid liability. Under
R.U.C.C. § 4-301, the payor bank that returns the item by its midnight deadline is entitled to
a settlement from the bank to which the return is made. Practically, this makes very little
difference. Compare id. § 4-301 with U.C.C. § 4-301.
221. R.U.C.C. §§ 4-302(1)(a), 4-302(1)(b). The drafters reasoned that there is no need to
make a bank accountable for an item when it has already settled for the item. Id. § 4-302
comment 1. The drafters recognized the inconsistencies between present Code sections. See id.
§ 4-215 Official Comment 4.
222. Id. § 4-302. Section 4-302 retains the language excepting breach of presentment warranty
from accountability. It is unclear why the drafters feel the need to expressly provide an
exception for presentment warranty in § 4-302, which covers the unusual situation where no
settlement has been made, but not in § 4-301, which covers the typical situation where a
settlement has been made. Id. § 4-302(3). The presentment warranties are found in §§ 3-418
and 4-305.
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addressed is whether the recovery rights under proposed section 3-419 would
provide a similar defense. No mention is made in proposed article 4 of the
role that section 3-419 would play. Section 4-302 provides that in addition
to the situation where there is a breach of presentment warranty, account-
ability is inapplicable where "the person seeking enforcement of the liability
presented or transferred the item for the purpose of defrauding the payor
bank." 22 This is a much narrower defense than is specified in present
U.C.C. section 4-302 which allows defenses "such as" breach of warranty
"or the like." R.U.C.C. section 4-302 provides only for the defenses of
breach of presentment warranty and fraud.224 The drafters, however, make
clear in the official comments to section 4-302 that this language is intended
to reject decisions holding that a bank's liability under the accountability
provision is absolute.3 The extent of this rejection is unclear. If the drafters
had intended restitution from section 3-419 to offer a means of relief for
the payor bank, they should have so specified. Instead, it is unclear from
the statutory language what role, if any, section 3-419 plays in check
collections.
The drafters make clear by comment in article 3 that their intent is to
allow the availability of section 3-419 relief even where the item has been
paid through the check collection process.26 This language is a substantial
improvement over present Code treatment; however, addressing this matter
in a comment fails to adequately address the concerns raised in this Article.
First, the statutory language in article 4 fails to provide allowance for
restitution. While the comments are evidence of legislative intent, they might
not control over the plain meaning of the statute. It is unclear why the
drafters would explicitly provide for recovery in the instance of breach of
warranty but not mention restitution. Second, if restitution is allowed, the
questions raised about the nature of accountability2 7 remain unanswered.
223. Id. § 4-302(3).
224. The example given in the comments would permit a payor bank to escape liability to
the defrauder operating a check kiting scheme. Id. § 4-302 Official Comment 4.
225. See id. This is opposed to the absolute liability found by many courts interpreting
present § 4-302. See supra notes 121-22, 148-54 and accompanying text.
226. R.U.C.C. § 3-419 Official Comment 3. Comment 3 provides:
The right of the drawee to recover a payment or to revoke an acceptance
under Section 3-419 is not affected by the rules under article 4 that determine
when an item is paid. Even though a payor bank may have paid an item under
proposed Section 4-215, it may have a right to recover the payment under Section
3-419. National Sav. & Trust Co. v. Park Corp., 722 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1983),
cert. denied, 466 U.S. 939 (1984), correctly states the present law on the issue.
Id. It is unclear why the drafters chose the Park case to cite with approval. The Park case
was an insufficient funds case. While the common law in Ohio allows for recovery of mistaken
payments in an insufficient funds situation, it has traditionally not been allowed in a majority
of states. See supra notes 51-53, 81, 112 and accompanying text. Reference to Park illustrates
the difficulties inherent in proposed § 3-419. See supra notes 185-217 and accompanying text.
227. See supra notes 167-69 and accompanying text.
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Third, the proposed changes create another problem. If one reads proposed
article 4 to allow the payor bank to obtain restitution of the mistaken
payment under section 3-419, it is unclear whether the payor bank could
assert only common law restitution or the restitutionary right created under
subsection (a) of section 3-419. In this way, the R.U.C.C. may have in fact
worsened the situation because proposed section 3-419 embodies not one,
but two independent theories of recovery: common law restitution under
subsection (b) and a statutory recovery right under subsection (a). It is not
clear how either one relates to the article 4 provisions.
An additional concern is that defenses are available to the payor bank
only under section 4-302, but this section is only applicable where neither
a settlement nor a dishonor has been made by the payor bank.2 This
situation would be highly unusual. In the far more typical situation, the
payor bank settles for the item promptly. The R.U.C.C. treats this settlement
as payment under section 4-215. Section 4-301 specifies the circumstances
under which a payor bank that has already settled for the item is entitled
to undo the payment and obtain payment by returning the item by its
midnight deadline. 229 No mention is made in sections 4-213, 4-215, or 4-302
of any other defenses that the payor bank might assert to undo the payment.
Thus, R.U.C.C. article 4 does not solve the problems present in article 4
of the U.C.C. In addition, the R.U.C.C. fails to resolve adequately the
apparent conflicts between articles 3 and 4.
The problems encountered under the present Code relating to the recovery
of mistaken payments are complex and seemingly intractable. The current
drafting project, which proposes a major revision of the Code, offers an
opportunity to correct and clarify the many problems with the present Code.
However, the current version of the R.U.C.C. fails to offer workable
solutions. The next section sets forth a proposed solution that the drafting
committee should consider in the next R.U.C.C. draft.
V. TowARD A UNIMFD THEORY OF RECOVERY
The foregoing analysis of the proposed changes in U.C.C. articles 3 and
4 shows that not only does the R.U.C.C. perpetuate the original drafting
blunder, it compounds it. The R.U.C.C. embodies not two, but three,
independent and potentially conflicting theories of recovering mistaken
payments. The first and most predominant is warranty under R.U.C.C.
section 3-418. The second is common law restitution expressly incorporated
under subsection (b) of section 3-419. The third is the newly created statutory
right of recovery under subsection (a) of section 3-419. Multiple theories of
228. R.U.C.C. § 4-302(1)(a).
229. Id. § 4-301(1).
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recovery will be the source of numerous problems under the R.U.C.C. in
the same way that they have been under the Code. Instead of using the
R.U.C.C. project as an opportunity to resolve the many problems that
relate to recovering mistaken payments under the Code, the drafters have
created the potential for a number of new problems.
The solution to the problems highlighted in this Article is one that
apparently has not been considered by the R.U.C.C. drafters. The solution
is basically one of rectifying the original drafting blunder. Recovery of
mistaken payments under the Code should be based on a unified theory of
recovery. The R.U.C.C. drafters should either establish a warranty basis of
recovery and at the same time abolish any vestige of common law restitution,
or establish a restitutionary basis of recovery and at the same time abolish
any related warranty action. Either theory is adequate to accomplish the
goal of establishing a rational and comprehensive system of rules and
principles for recovering mistaken payments.
In one respect, a restitutionary basis of recovery is most appropriate given
that recovering mistaken payments has traditionally been (and to a signifi-
cant extent still is) equitable in nature. The inherent weakness of a resti-
tutionary theory of recovery is its uncertainty and unpredictability. To be
consistent with the nature of the action, the recipient of the mistaken
payment should be allowed to assert virtually any argument in order to
show that it would not be unjust to keep the payment. Moreover, the
concept of mistake in common law restitution is perhaps too narrow to fit
within modem banking practices. In view of the common law, when a bank
pays an item in the face of doubts about the genuineness of a signature,
for example, it is probably not paying under a mistake of fact. The same
probably can be said in the case of a bank that pays an item without
bothering to check a signature.? 0 In such a case it can hardly be said that
230. For a discussion of the concept of mistake under common law restitution, see supra
notes 23-27 and accompanying text. Although conventional wisdom suggests that banks,
especially large banks, typically do not verify the drawer's signature on items presented for
payment, recent empirical research on this issue indicates that most payor banks do check the
drawer's signature on all or a substantial number of checks. Murray, Price v. Neal in the
Electronic Age: An Empirical Survey, 87 BA.xuiNo L.J. 686, 698-701 (1970). Professor Murray
reported that "only one bank out of 91 large American banks has 'adopted the practice of
not checking signatures on checks below a certain amount."' Id. at 701. The authors of this
Article are not aware of any further empirical research on this question since the publication
of Professor Murray's work in 1970. Nor do the authors have any evidence, other than
anecdotal evidence (such as reports of banks paying items without any drawer's signature),
that contradicts the basic findings of Professor Murray's empirical research. The anecdotal
evidence, however, is sometimes compelling. For example, according to a brief filed over ten
years ago in a case before a federal appeals court, Morgan Guaranty Trust examines signatures
only on checks of $10,000 or more. Note, Allocation, supra note 5, at 1090 n.90; see also
O'Malley, supra note 5, at 209. Nevertheless, in view of the very large number of items
processed each day by some large banks (approximately 36 billion checks are collected through
the Federal Reserve each year, Cooper, Checks Held Hostage-The Funds Availability Con-
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the bank was mistaken as to the genuineness of the signature when it was
consciously ignorant of the matter. In light of modern banking practices, a
restitutionary action will often not be available to the bank that pays an
item bearing forgeries or alterations. These problems may make restitution
unacceptable as the basis of recovering mistaken payments under the Code.
On the other hand, warranty is susceptible to the same criticism today as
it was when it first emerged as a minority theory of recovery. It may be,
however, too late to abandon warranty. It has become an integral part of
not only the U.C.C., including article 2, but of modem commercial law in
general. 23l The relative certainty and predictability of warranty encouraged
this development.
The recovery of mistaken payments should be governed by a unified
warranty theory of recovery. This can be accomplished by first incorporating
into the warranty provisions the situations where recovery is currently based
on restitution. Some courts used a similar technique in originally fashioning
warranty as a minority theory of recovery at common law. The categories
of mistaken payment cases allowing for recovery, as well as those precluding
recovery, were retained under an entirely different theory.
The R.U.C.C. drafters have demonstrated, perhaps unwittingly, how the
same result can be accomplished under different theories. Looking at the
newly created warranty provisions dealing with M.I.C.R. check encoding
problems in the check collection system, for example, the problems of
overencoding and underencoding have been specifically addressed by a new
warranty.232 M.I.C.R. errors are essentially part of a broader problem of
mistaken payments. Analysis of the recent cases and commentary dealing
with M.I.C.R. errors shows that they can be resolved either under common
law, with restitution or negligence, or warranty. While few cases are
reported, a common law approach is favored. 233 There is no need to use
troversy, 102 BAMcNG L.J. 532, 535 (1985)), it has become increasingly difficult to believe
that most banks continue to verify the signatures on most items. The authors believe that
while small banks may continue to verify the signature on most or all items, large banks verify
signatures only on large items. As a result, on a majority of items processed through the
check collection system today, the drawer's signature is not verified by the payor bank. For
a case in which the drawee's doubts about the genuineness of the drawer's signature were a
basis for denying recovery of the payment, see National Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 141 Mo.
App. 719, 125 S.W. 513 (1910).
231. See, e.g., U.C.C. §§ 2-312, 2-313, 2-314, 2-315 (1987); 12 C.F.R. § 210.6 (1989)
(Regulation J). Regulation CC has created a warranty to be made upon the return of an item.
Under § 229.34 the payor bank warrants that the item was returned within the applicable
deadline and that there is no material alteration. Id. § 229.34(a), (b). This provision demon-
strates how the warranty theory can be used to deal with situations that have been handled
traditionally under non-warranty approaches such as undue retention.
232. R.U.C.C. § 4-208(1); see supra note 183.
233. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. Bank of Bladenboro, 596 F.2d 632 (4th Cir. 1979);
Exchange Bank v. Florida Nat'l Bank, 292 So. 2d 361 (Fla. 1974). See generally B. CLARx,
supra note 126, at §§ 10-8 to 10-14.
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both theories. The R.U.C.C. drafters have fashioned a specific warranty to
achieve the result that most courts achieve through common law. Our
proposal is to follow this approach with respect to the remaining types of
mistake cases presently dealt with by restitution. These, of course, are found
in R.U.C.C. section 3-419.
The outline of the warranty provisions needed to achieve the objective
proposed here is fairly simple. Instead of providing for restitution in certain
cases, the drafters can provide for a breach of warranty action in those
same cases. The warranty provisions can also incorporate the holder in due
course and change of position defenses. 234 It is true that incorporating these
defenses will generate some degree of uncertainty in the warranty scheme,
but it creates no more uncertainty than exists under the present U.C.C.
warranty sections 3-417 and 4-207, which incorporate the holder in due
course concept. On balance, the overall treatment of mistake cases will be
clarified because the uncertainty that results from doctrinal baggage that
comes with a restitutionary claim will be avoided. Care in drafting the
warranty provisions will avoid most of the difficulty encountered in reading
present U.C.C. sections 3-417 and 4-207. The second step in achieving a
unified theory of recovery is abolishing restitution as an alternative theory
of recovery in any mistaken payment case governed by the Code. This can
be accomplished by specifying that warranty is the exclusive means of
recovering any mistaken payment governed by the Code. In other words,
restitution should be expressly displaced.
The unified warranty theory of recovery proposed will not only avoid the
conflicts between restitution and warranty, it will finally resolve the conflict
between the recovery of mistaken payments under restitution and the ac-
countability concept of article 4. U.C.C. section 4-302 and R.U.C.C. section
4-302 both expressly allow a payor bank to assert breach of warranty as a
defense in an action based on undue retention. By making warranty the
exclusive basis of recovering all mistaken payments, the potential conflict
with any restitutionary rights of the payor is eliminated.
234. Adding the change of position defense to the warranty action would change current
law. See supra notes 82-83, 91-97, 178 and accompanying text. For cases involving the mistaken
payment of a materially altered item, the change is justified. The payee or recipient of a check
bearing a material alteration is, unlike a forged indorsement, not in the best position to detect
the wrongdoing. Obviously, neither is the payor bank in a good position to detect the alteration.
However, once the materially altered item is paid by the payor and the recipient changes his
or her position in good faith reliance on the payment, who should bear the loss when the
alteration is discovered? As between the payor bank and the recipient of the payment, the
equities favor the recipient after the good faith change of position. The few jurisdictions that
rejected Price v. Neal nevertheless recognized that a good faith change of position in reliance
on the mistaken payment would preclude its recovery by the drawee. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text. For an example of a case taking this approach, see First Nat'l Bank v.
Bank of Wyndmere, 108 N.W. 546, 549 (N.D. 1906).
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CONCLUSION
In the prefatory note to the R.U.C.C., the drafters criticize the Code for
following prior law too closely. 5 The analysis of the R.U.C.C. set forth
in Part IV of this Article shows that this same criticism can be leveled
against the R.U.C.C. The R.U.C.C. drafters have made essentially the same
blunder as the drafters of the Code-incorporating independent and poten-
tially conflicting theories of recovering mistaken payments. As a result, the
R.U.C.C. drafters have also failed to clarify adequately the relationship
between the article 3 recovery rights and the accountability concept of article
4. The changes they propose are at best superficial, and may actually have
worsened the situation by providing for three independent theories of
recovery.
The approach outlined in this Article, a unified theory of recovery, can
provide a basis for finally resolving the present problems under the Code
relating to the recovery of mistaken payments. It will provide a single basis
of recovery under article 3. The basis we propose is warranty. At the same
time, it will finally provide a way to clarify the relationship between article
3 recovery rights and the accountability concept of article 4. Thus, the
current draft of the R.U.C.C. should not be adopted unless the rules for
recovering mistaken payments are reconsidered and substantially revised.
235. R.U.C.C. Prefatory Note i (July/August Draft, as amended March 15, 1989).
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